

**MPEKETONI RESIDENTS' PERCEPTION OF TERROR ATTACKS ON SOCIO-
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO SECURITY
IMPROVEMENT IN LAMU COUNTY, KENYA**

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DECLARATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and to the best of my knowledge has not been presented for examination of any degree in any Institute or University.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

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DEDICATIONS

I dedicate this work to the heroes whose every single minute and thought are spent in exploring ways and means to curb terror related activities in Kenya, those who are conscious that terrorism is cancerous to the economy and development of the nation.

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It is by the grace of the almighty God that I was finally able to complete this thesis. May the glory be to God. The academic accomplishment was not only my effort but also the strong support and understanding from my wife who provided informational, spiritual and emotional guidance.

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ABSTRACT

This study assessed Mpeketoni Residents' Perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities in Lamu County, Kenya. It was motivated by the reported state of insecurity state in the country. The concern was particularly within Mpeketoni region as a result of Al-Shabaab militia insurgency among the communities along the coastal region in Kenya. This study was guided by the following specific objectives; to assess the Mpeketoni residents' social perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities and government response to security improvement, to establish the Mpeketoni residents' economic perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities and government response to security improvement and to analyze the Mpeketoni residents' security perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities and government response to security improvement in Lamu County, Kenya. This study was informed by Social control and deterrent Theory. Descriptive survey research design was adopted. A target population of 200 respondents consisting of the terror victims, village elders, youths and women was used. Sample size of this study was 120 respondents using Yamane's formula on sample size. Terror victims and village elders were sampled using snowball sampling, while the key informants were purposively sampled. Primary data was collected using interview schedules and questionnaires were sent to key informants. Qualitative data were analyzed using thematic method; while quantitative data was analyzed using descriptive frequencies with the aid of Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS). The study result in terms of social perception, 64% of the respondents stated that they had reduced visiting to social places such as pubs, shopping malls, restaurants and others said their neighbours had relocated to other areas regions in Lamu County where they consider safer for their family. In terms of attendance of religious services, immediately after terror the respondent stated that they reduced attending church/mosque services. However, after a few months the faithful picked up and services resumed. The study result in terms of economy, 93% of the respondents reported that there was a reduction in investment opportunities, entrepreneurs activities as many traders closed shop and some relocated to other areas, employment levels declined particularly employment of casual labourers who opted to move to Lamu town and others Mombasa, the cost of living rose due to an increase in the price of basic commodities. On security perception business people were forced to boost security procedures to protect their property and customers. In conclusion, this study established that terror attacks had great socio-economic impact on the welfare of the residents of Mpeketoni region since the attacks derailed key communal projects. This study recommends that the Kenyan government should amicably strategize counter-terror measures such as; empowering intelligence collection techniques, investing in intelligence led policing, targeting recruiters and designing anti-terrorism systems within the County in order to protect its assets and citizens.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AMISON	African Union Mission in Somalia
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GWOT	Global War on Terror
9/11	11 th September 2001
IRA	Irish-Republican-Army
KDF	Kenya Defence Force
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
SCT	Social Control Theory
SARS	South African Revenue Service

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

This study examined Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities in Lamu County, Kenya. One of the most direct and serious security threats facing governments of the world is terrorism. It is a transnational crime that goes beyond the purview of the state security. According to Pettiford & Harding (2003) terrorism has become the defining issue of international politics of the first decade of the 21st century, while research on terrorism and terrorism-related issues has risen in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. It has increasingly become a global problem that requires concerted action by the community of nations (Omeje and Githigaro, 2010). Terrorism is defined as a premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003), whereas international terrorism means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country and in most cases is one of the most detrimental terror activity to the society.

Otiso (2009) pointed out that terror activities have gained international attention because of its overall effect on nation-states and societies. Its adverse socio-psychological and political ramifications have had very significant economic consequences, as they have forced governments in the world to finance counter-terrorism measures, which in return, have burdened the economy, primarily through adverse effects on the defense budgets as well as on general budget figures. This study notes that terrorism has negatively affected not only the national economies, but also the international economies. This study further points out that with the end of the Cold War in 1991, there were dramatic improvements in the ease of transnational communication, commerce and travel thus bringing about economic stability and resilience in many countries that were affected.

The Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa have been scenes of conflicts and terror attacks in the recent past. Kenya has experienced increased terror attacks since 2012. Al-Shabaab, which is Al-Qaeda's affiliate militant group in Somalia, has claimed responsibility for most of the attacks. The theoretical and political debates underpinning the 'causes' or 'conditions' for increased terrorism activities in Kenya have come up with several contrasting hypotheses which fall into two categories. One line of argument focuses on *external causes* which include: Kenya's proximity to unstable neighbours (Aronson, 2013), Kenya's close ties with Western countries (Adan, 2005) and the presence of Kenya's troops in Somalia (GOK, 2014).

Abraham (2013) established that the terrorist organization's structure, membership, resources, and security determine its capabilities and reach. The Sub-Saharan African region has experienced prolonged and severe intra and inter-state conflict, leading to instability, poverty, and political isolation that make it vulnerable to terrorist exploitation (Pillar, 2001). For instance, Pillar (2000) notes that, civil war in Somalia has left the country without a fully functioning national government since 1991 and has been an important factor fueling the spread of violent radicalism in East Africa today. Kenya has long been an African success story, a place that has been relatively stable, peaceful and prosperous despite being in a neighborhood rocked by major disasters for decades this study notes that the recent sporadic terror attacks has immensely tainted the country's international and local image thus being referred to as a "hot bed of terror".

Aronson (2013) states that in the past two decades Kenya has been a target of various terror attacks attributed to terrorist elements. On August 7th 1998, the US Embassy in Nairobi was attacked in which over 200 lives were lost. Jeanne and Harold (2007) remarked that with regard to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) championed by the US government, there appears to be a convergence of interest between the Kenyan state security apparatus and the US foreign policy goals on security. In 1980, the Jewish-owned Norfolk hotel was attacked. The bomb killed 20 people of several nationalities, wounded 87 more, and destroyed much of the west wing. It was believed to be an act of revenge by pro-Palestinian militants for Kenya's supporting role in Israel's operation.

According to Boone (2012) Kenya has a long history of land injustices and grievances and any domestic economic grievances are related to land therefore, this study viewed that land grievances constitute the fulcrum of domestic terrorism in some parts of the country. Land is pursued indirectly and beneath other factors like ethnicity. Less research has been done to establish the interaction between land grievances and domestic terrorism in Kenya. Land grievances have only been mentioned to supplement other internal conditions facilitating radicalization.

In 1998, the US embassy in Nairobi was bombed, as was the Israeli-owned Paradise hotel four years later (Mephram, 2002). Shafir (2013) argued that in 2013 the militant group Al-Shabaab killed over 80 people at Nairobi's Westgate Shopping Mall. In October 2011, a coordinated operation between the Somali military and the Kenyan military began against the Al-Shabaab group of insurgents in southern Somalia. According to Abraham (2013) the mission was officially led by the Somali army, with the Kenyan forces providing a support role being that the country was a primary victim of terror attacks especially in Nairobi, North Eastern region and Coastal region.

Henderson (2008) points out that there has been a series of explosions that have rocked various areas in Kenya, bombings which are believed to have been retaliatory attacks by Al-Shabaab due to Kenyan military operations in Somalia to weed out Al-Shabaab networks. United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (2012) reports that, in the past one and half decade, recently between 2012- 2014, there have been at least 20 attacks involving grenades or explosive devices in Kenya. Sandler (2012) explained that at least 108 people have died in these attacks, and around 300 people injured. Postuma (2011) acknowledged that most of these attacks occurred in North Eastern region, including locations in Dadaab, Wajir, and Garissa and Coast region. Other attacks occurred in Nairobi within Eastleigh area and others within the Central Business District (CBD) commercial premises. All these attacked have led to negative perception among the citizen in Kenya and as a result socio-economic activities have declined.

According to Servers (2012) targets included police stations and police vehicles, night-clubs and bars, churches, religious gatherings, a down town building of small shops, and a bus station. A number of factors explain why Kenya has been a victim of past terrorist attacks. The main factors are geography, ethnic composition, political stability, unstable neighbors, poverty,

Islamic fundamentalism and tax law enforcement (Adan, 2005). This study provides a descriptive analysis of the experiences, challenges and effects of recurrent incidences of terror attacks with an aim of drawing recommendations that will benefit security stakeholders and national security policy makers in expediting their fight against terror attacks as well as helping victims and families of terror related activities.

According to Kenya Daily Nation (2014), between 15 June and 17 June 2014, more than 60 people were killed in attacks in and near Mpeketoni, Lamu County. The Somalia-based Al-Shabaab militant group claimed responsibility, but the Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta asserted that the attacks were organized by local politicians with ties to a network of gangs. Correspondents from the area suggested that the attacks may have been motivated by ethnic or religious hatred, or revenge for land grabbing.

According to standard E-paper (2014), On 15 June 2014, about 50 masked gunmen hijacked a van and raided a police station in the predominantly Christian town of Mpeketoni, as well as burning hotels, restaurants, and government offices. At least 53 people were reportedly killed during the attack, and eight others were unaccounted for as of 18 June. Most of the dead Kenyans were Kikuyus. On 17 June 2014, assailants set fire to houses in the villages of Majembeni and Poromoko, near Mpeketoni. At least fifteen people were killed. According to an eyewitness, the attackers also went door-to-door, pulling people out of their homes and demanding they prove they were Muslim.

Due to frequent occurrence of attack in Lamu County, The result is a sense of fear, despair and helplessness because it appears as if Kenya is at the mercy of the Al Shabaab who appears to be invincible and unstoppable. The citizen perception on government to curb has decline and thus negative perception among Mpeketoni residents that this study took a critical look in documentation.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Terrorism in Kenya displays a pattern of repeated attacks. Aftermath of terror attacks have implications on socio-economics and psycho-social. This security threat therefore seems to be causing a shift in Kenya's security. Terror attack in Kenya has put a heavy cost on the country as witnessed by the loss of workers and family members due to terrorist attacks. It has led to a flare-up of tension between Christians and Muslims, undermined the country's socio-economic activities especially tourism and, led to the erosion of citizens' rights and the country's sovereignty. This is attributed to the creation of climate of uncertainty that envelopes the country whenever attacks happen. This prevents potential investors from making new capital investment as they are unsure of the economic perception of the attacks and thus overlook Kenya for more stable economies. Terrorist attacks also affect the transportation industry because demand for air travel declines, passenger fares decline, and the inability of heightened airline security personnel to readily process travelers lead to further declines. Mpeketoni has been a victim of repeated terrorist attacks. However, not much literature is available on Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities in Lamu County. Hence, the need for this study.

1.3 Objectives of this study

1.3.1 Broad Objective

The broad objective of this study was to assess Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities and government's response to security improvement in Lamu County, Kenya.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

- i. To assess the Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on social activities and government's response to security improvement in Lamu County, Kenya
- ii. To examine the Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on economic activities and government's response to security improvement in Lamu County, Kenya
- iii. To analyze the Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on security and government's response to security improvement in Lamu County, Kenya

1.4 Research Questions

- i. What were Mpeketoni residents' perceptions of terror attacks on social activities and government's response to security improvement in Lamu County, Kenya?
- ii. What is the Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on economic activities and government's response to security improvement in Lamu County, Kenya?
- iii. How is the Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on security and government's response to security improvement in Lamu County, Kenya?

1.5 Justifications for this study

Firstly, it is the aim of this study to help in understanding some of the key social motives of terrorism in Kenya and its aftermath effect on the livelihoods of the coastal residents such as the one experienced on 15th June, 2014 among Mpeketoni residents who greatly felt the social detriments of terror attack after loss of friends and relatives. This study contributes to a review of counter-terrorism social measures in enhancing their human rights and constitutional principles.

Secondly, this study expects the Government of Kenya to greatly benefit from the economic results through the Ministry of Trade and Tourism in policy formulation to grow the tourism industry. The Government continually allocates significant amounts of resources to market the Kenyan tourist product both locally and internationally to attract new arrivals and open new markets. The returns from all these efforts have not always been commensurate to the amount of resources put in marketing because of the imminent threats posed by the insecurity brought about by terrorist attacks. There is need for policy shifts to enable the security arms pay greater attention to economic matters to boost tourist confidence and also to avoid unnecessary travel advisories.

Thirdly, in order to address this need for better security strategies this sought to establish the relationship between terror attacks and the implications on social and economic activities such as tourism. In examining the impacts of these activities on business strategies, this study sought to re-ignite a fresh discussion on the adverse effects of these terrorist activities. This enables the industry players to take stock of the impacts of these attacks on their bed occupation levels, customer confidence and feedback, increase in security costs and the impact on employee morale in providing quality services to customers at within Lamu Region and Mpeketoni

community at large. The knowledge that was generated from this study can be used to improve business strategies and also to lobby the Government to re-focus on the security issue to make the country more competitive and marketable. The information that will be generated in the research will be valuable in forming the basis of future academic research and formulation of policy documents.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of this Study

This study was limited to Mpeketoni perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities and government response to security improvement in Lamu County. This is because most of the attacks have occurred in Mpeketoni region and its surrounding, which is a residential and commercial estate predominantly, populated by ethnic Somalis and Kikuyu. The main criterion for enlisting them in the study was that they reside or operate businesses in Mpeketoni and have experienced/witnessed a terrorist attack. Collecting data from respondents, who are spread all over the Mpeketoni, was a huge task. Also another challenge had to do with booking appointments with heads of households. As one can imagine with interview schedules and focus group discussion, it was very difficult to arrange a meeting with the respondents as a result of their tight schedules. Sometimes respondents failed to honor appointments scheduled with them.

Most of the interview sessions were often interrupted by phone calls and drop-in visitors, which sometimes made us, lose focus of the topic under discussion. Sometimes, we had to break and reschedule the interview for another time or day. This posed a serious challenges and limitations to the study during the sampling of the Mpeketoni residents. In order to overcome the challenges and limitations, of wide spread of residences within Lamu County, snowballing technique was applied such that the researcher would identify knowledgeable respondents to assist in getting the next respondent. On other hand, administering interview schedules and focus group discussion at the time respondents were working also made the research process burdensome to some respondents. The study first established the best times to collect data. Data collection was then scheduled to suit the circumstances of various respondents. Caution was, however, taken to ensure that data collection period was not unnecessary prolonged.

1.7 Definition of Terms

Communities	a group of people living in the same place or having a particular characteristic in common
Economic Perception	Actions that involve the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services at all levels within a society such as farming and tourism.
Government response	refers to the mechanisms that the government put in place to counter terrorism in the country for example the KDF, GSU and intelligent personnel
Social Perception	Relating to or involving activities in which people spend time talking to each other or doing enjoyable things with each other.
Security	According to Huddy <i>et al.</i> (2002) this refers to a state of being free from danger or threat
Security improvement	refers to the level of security in terms of peace in the country.
Security perception	it refers to an assessment of the probability of danger and how much people are concerned about potential consequences (Sjöberg <i>et al.</i> 2004).
Terrorism	is the deliberate use of violence directed at innocent people, targeted at the few in order to influence the many or heir leaders, designed for political purposes, perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity that is organized with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (Abraham, 2013).

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presented the literature related to this study. The focus was based on the research objectives; Mpeketoni residents' social perception of terror attacks and government response to security improvement, Mpeketoni residents' economic perception of terror attacks and government response to security improvement, Mpeketoni residents' security perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities and government response to security improvement in Lamu County, theoretical framework and conceptual framework.

2.2 Perception on Social Activities

According to Creswell (2009), the social constructionism paradigm originated from the work of Lincoln and Guba (1985) and is utilized by researchers who aspire to understand how individuals interpret and give meaning to events and occurrences in their daily lives. According Henderson (2008) reported that terrorism has had massive impact on the social life in Kenya. This assertion concurs with Zaman *et al.* (2012) in their results stated that one of the worst hit social areas by terrorism is education and religious practices. In that “respondents claimed that the waves of terrorism in the province had deprived them of entertainment and refreshment, adding that people were even afraid of having fun in parks”. Consequently, this reduced social activity in the area as well as affected the earning capacity of the Mpeketoni residents.

In a study conducted in Israel by Arian (2003), Muslims were seen as a security threat to the Israelis. Stereotyping has resultantly been on the rise, leading people in society to have a negative feeling towards the group that the terrorists claim to represent. For example, when the terrorists separate Christians from Muslims and then kill Christians, this tends to create an image of Muslims as terrorists. Hostility and suspicion of those that the terrorist group represents is also on the increase in society, Arian (2003b). Today, most institutions and premises such as places of worship, schools, shops, restaurants and other public utilities are unsafe. People have to be searched in order to access them. There is a general social mistrust of the other, representing insecurity. The family institutions have also been affected by terrorism through loss of their

members and more recently the fact that children have not been spared by terrorists as victims of injuries and death (Falola, 2002). This study believes that children have also been recruited into terror networks in schools, clubs, churches and mosques. Terror on social media is also taking advantage of the mass communication techniques to lure young people into joining the networks, sometimes without the knowledge of their parents or guardians.

Religious venues have become the most active terror zones in Kenya (Vanhove, 2011). In fact, at one time, most people feared places of worship because of terror threats. Terrorists have also succeeded to use some religious affiliations to radicalize some youths and cause mayhem, with the intention to divide Kenyans along religious groups. According to United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (2012) in the market, people are devastated from terrorist acts as human tragedies happened most of the time. Because of fear, many people would not want to take the risk to start a business as terrorism could strike anytime and anywhere and eventually it brings down the economy (Shafir, 2013). The current study indicated that such history of the past may make it difficult to integrate different ethnic and religious groups successfully because of their past experiences. Thus government should preach cohesion among the residents in Mpeketoni.

Servers (2012) revealed that resilience will occur even if a terrorist attacks, the society will unite together to overcome the catastrophe that changes the security system and become more secure and confident than before. What's more about effect of the market is the human loss in a terrorist act is heartbreaking news for the victim's loved ones. The loss of potential labor workers in a company suffered more hardship than losing profits (Thompson, 2008). This study points out that the cost of security purposes was burden for most of the companies as they might decrease the price of the stock that would lead to disappointment from the stockholders. Hence, bedeviling the social-economic status within the Mpeketoni region and the entire Lamu County

According to Pillar (2001) using the incident of September 11th in Mississippi, social conflict has been rising due to fear and horrified by the incident among citizens. After past few days of the incident, people were lined up around the gas station before gas prices rose two dollar a gallon. The governor of Mississippi took immediate action against local gas suppliers as they were found guilty on raising the gas prices (Hared, 2013). Eventually set off havoc between the local gas suppliers and customer in different states, and people were fighting for the gas. In addition,

Kuto (2004) mentioned about the rumors which were spread about the shortage of food due to the gas prices and soon everyone felt the state of panic. This study concurs with the research finds by Pollack and Wood (2010) note that in cases where a situation after an attack seems to be mishandled, the citizens may lose confidence in the government and public institutions. In order to gain public trust and confidence, the government may take measures that may violate the civil liberties. A government may for example easily pass anti-terror laws that are contrary to human rights simply because they are supported by the public. The aftermath perception of post-terror attacks on social and economic set-ups within the affected communities such as the attacks witnessed in 2014 within Mpeketoni region where the community was cut off from essential social amenities and livelihoods have just led to negative perception from the residents towards their neighborhoods.

The works in this section by different authors has decisively dealt with the aftermath of terror attack on social amenities and putting little effort on the resident's perception. However, they have not clearly shown us the influence on social-physiological impact and effectiveness of government response mechanism in developing countries, Kenya among them. This study intended to fill the gap by determining the influence of terror attack on Mpeketon's resident's social activities and government's response to security improvement in Lamu County, Kenya.

2.3 Perception on Economic Activities

Losses of human life and suffering in the aftermath of a terrorist attack can be tremendous and may be even considered as an economic loss particularly in today's society where numbers count. According to Moustapha (2002) noted that one of the most direct impacts of terrorism is on the society's economic well-being. The focus of this study was on both direct and indirect effects of terror attack. The direct impact of terrorist assaults can be determined relatively easily by summing up the costs of the material damage following an attack. Indirect effects are in contrast often hard to measure: 'Estimates of the costs of terror confront problems of different types, including the measurement of losses, aggregation issues, avoidance of double counting of damages in different sectors or statistics, and the causality of second round and indirect effects' (Bruck and Wickstrom, 2004).

In a study done by Barth *et al.* (2006) in United States on 9/11, they expound that terrorist incidents have an immediate and direct economic impact on a nation's capital stock both physical and human. While the terrorist attacks in the United States on 9/11 spurred new research to quantify the economic loss, some results indicated relatively little destruction of capital stock. This however does not negate the economic impact of terrorism particularly in Mpeketoni. Guelke (2009) further states that in Africa terrorist groups have sought out economic targets to inflict both financial and human casualties. For example; an Islamic Group staged the Luxor massacre of tourists on 17 November 1997 at Hatshepsut's Temple in Egypt. The attack affected the economy of Luxor region by causing a decline in the number of tourists visiting the area. In Indonesia, a study done by Baker and Coulter (2007) after the terror attacks in 2002 and 2005 revealed that, tourist arrivals declined drastically after the two incidents of terror attacks due to increased risk perceptions.

On a separate note, in Kenya, tourist arrivals declined by 20% from September – December 2013 as compared to the same period in 2012 after the West-Gate terror attacks in September 2013 (Kenya Tourist Report, 2014). In Kenya, where much of the foreign earning/revenue rely on tourism, agriculture and foreign investors, the economic conditions become more vulnerable whenever there is a terror attack. According to the Kenya Tourism Board (2015), tourism accounts for 12% of Kenya's GDP as of May 2013, generating nearly 21% of foreign exchange earnings and making it the second largest after Agriculture. It is evident that terrorism affects the economy by undermining tourism sector, which is evident in massive loss of tourists due to travel advisories translating into loss of revenue caused by loss of guests, jobs and foreign earning (Mogire and Agade, 2011). The above review was replicated through the finding in Mpeketoni especially when USA embassy issued travel advisory calling on their citizens to stop traveling to Kenya.

Neumayer (2004) asserted that in terms of economic investments; terrorism affects investors' confidence in the economy. This study observes that in the Kenyan coast region for instance, most Germany and Italian investors in Lamu County where Mpeketoni is located were forced to close down their businesses due to terror threats and insecurity. Pillar (2001) asserted that as a consequence there has been loss of job opportunities for local workers, suppliers and a chain of other stakeholders that rely on hospitality industry. Postuma (2011) further noted that terror

activities both in the Kenya and the Somalia international waters have been blamed for economic inflation in the country. Sandler (2012) acknowledged that terror activities like hijacking of ships inflated prices of fuel and basic industrial commodities made life costly for most Kenyans to afford. Thompson (2008) maintained that there is also economic loss encountered in loss of human capital. This study notes that whenever terror attack happens, many people lose life while many others lose their source of livelihood. Consequently, this study reports that the attacks witnessed in Mpeketoni region led to the destruction of property and loss of bread winners for most of the families and/or homes, and the end result is poverty.

Silke *et al.* (2012) reported that another economic cost of terrorism is in terms of compensation for the losses, medical bills and the general interruption of development plans. For instance, millions of shillings intended for development are now diverted for emergency to cater for victims of terror attacks, reconstruction of the economy destroyed, compensation and reinforcement of security apparatus (Otiso, 2009). Results from this study within Mpeketoni region revealed that the overall result was that terrorism makes an economic environment unstable for investment, leads to loss of human life depended upon for economic growth. The consequences also bring about economic inflation, divert resources, attention and interfere with budgetary planning of the economy.

The a negative shock such as a terrorist event is expected to incur an increase in public security spending (Brück, 2006), in fact, Stevens (2003) contends that governments and other public authorities have increased their overall spending on security, in some cases quite substantially. The US Homeland Security budget doubled from fiscal year 2002/03 to its current level (2004) of well over US\$ 30 billion: funding for aviation security is now running at US\$ 4.8 billion and for border security at US\$ 10.6 billion. He concludes that such investments are funded by government taxes or private spending. Consequently, even if this will not incur significant budgetary impacts, economic impacts will still be significant.

In contrast, Gupta *et al.* (2006) analyzed the changes in composition of public spending in low and middle income countries show that terror and armed conflict leads to increases in defense spending with a negative impact on public spending on social and economic issues. Thus, they show that the fiscal effects of defense and security spending in medium and low-income countries can have a significantly negative fiscal impact and consequences for future economic

growth. The study deduced that after the attack in Mpeketoni much resident loss many of their properties worth millions and this derailed their economic status

2.4 Perception on security and government's response after Terror Attack

According to Llusca and Tavares (2006) in the last ten years, terrorism, its consequences and how to counteract it, have become a household discussion subject and the object of intense scrutiny by social scientists. Terrorism aims to cause fear and concern for personal safety. That concern tends to create negative feelings towards the terrorists and their cause rather than solidarity with their demands. Waxman (2011) explains that “a sense of victimhood is common to a society experiencing terrorism.” The result may be a “hardening of attitudes and crystallization of opposition to the cause pursued by the terrorists”. Studies conducted on Israelis after several attacks indicated that terrorism is capable of inducing fear and worry for personal safety beyond the actual damage of the attack (Friedl and Merari, 1985). Terror attack in Mpeketoni was aimed to create an atmosphere of anxiety, worry and fear for personal safety because people are not able to control where it will happen next, simply because terrorists use random tactics which are hard to predict.

In a case study conducted by Associated Press, (2014) reported that terror attacks by the Boko Haram militants in Northern Nigeria has led to death of more than two thousand people that year alone, destruction of properties especially churches and kidnapping of more than two hundred school girls. The resident for Northern Nigeria felt abandoned by their government. They are claimed that the security forces was tipped that the Boko Haram was preparing to take hostage the girls but the Nigeria army could not take any preventive measures. There was worldwide outrage when it was reported that there were no attempts by the Nigerian forces to recapture the girls even after three weeks hence the international pressure dubbed, “bring back our girls” (Abubakar, 2014). The study revealed that lack of confidence by the citizens that the government can offer them adequate security has led to the rise of vigilante groups that take retaliatory attacks targeting the members and sympathizers of Al-Shabaab. This has led to a cycle of revenge attacks, which have taken a religious angle.

According to Alexander (2009) terrorism and terrorist activities have led to political realignments in the world politics. For instance, Kenya and the rest of Africa are members to NEPAD, while the African Union through military institutions like AMISON have taken over political responsibilities to influence response to terror attacks(Blanchard,2013).Terrorism destabilizes political arrangements, results in confusion, leads to loss of revenue; make the political system vulnerable, especially with lack of relevant policies. Consequently Shafir (2013) asserted that terrorism challenges the existing political institutions. In Mpeketoni for instance, there has been a tag of war and blame game between the executive, the judiciary, the police and intelligence services, with each blaming each other for ineffectiveness leading to the recurrent incidences of terror.

Concepcion *et al.* (2003) argued that terrorism also makes the political institutions vulnerable to external influences. For instance, Kenya has to rely on the US, Britain, Australia, Russia, Israel and Germany among others, for intelligence on terrorism, technical assistance, equipment and strategy which assist the country in fighting terrorism. According to Aronson (2013) the reliance on them comes with strings attached based on the interests of the donor nation, hence, compromising political sovereignty in the country, its institutions, and kind of policy frameworks that are eventually adopted. Mpeketoni is a place that has been relatively stable, peaceful and prosperous despite being in a community rocked by major disasters for decades.

Aldrich (2002) stated that there has been endless civil wars in Somalia; genocide in Rwanda; and famine in Ethiopia. Yet these calamities have, by and large, not spilled over to Kenya, which has been the turning point of East Africa, serving as a business, transportation and tourist hub (Adan, 2005). Kenya has always been one of the most outward-looking African countries with its linkages and relationship with the U.S, Europe, the Middle East and some countries of Asian continent. According to this study, Mpeketoni political stability since independence combined with its geo-strategic importance, has led it to be recognized by Western countries as a major hub for economic, diplomatic, and humanitarian activities for the East African and Horn of Africa region.

Aronson (2013) asserted that in the past two decades, Kenya has been a target of various terror attacks attributed to terrorist elements. On August 7th 1998, the US Embassy in Nairobi was attacked in which over 200 lives were lost. Subsequently this study postulates that the antiterrorism debate in Kenya is dominated by the regional policy agenda of the US government in which the Kenyan government is considered an important ally given the country's geographical and historical strategic proximity to the Middle East and the Arab world believed in Western security agendas to be the principal source of contemporary international terrorism.

Kenyan security forces responded after the attacks began. A combined security team of regular police, administration police, General Service Unit, Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, Kenya Defense Forces, and Kenya Wildlife Service rangers finally responded, their actions were often perceived positively and negatively. The government had to further redeployed the intelligent security to who collected data on the any matter related to plan of attack and simmering tensions among the residents, this boasted the confidence of the residents on improvement of security status.

With regard to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) championed by the US government, there appears to be a convergence of interest between the Kenyan state security apparatus and the US foreign policy goals on security (Jeanne and Harold, 2007). From the research results some citizens claimed that terror has been due to presence of KDF in Somalia. Asafa (2013) pointed out that in 1998 the US embassy in Nairobi was bombed as was the Israeli-owned Paradise hotel four years later. In 2013, the militant group Al-Shabaab killed over 80 people at Nairobi's Westgate Shopping Mall. In October 2011, a coordinated operation between the Somali military and the Kenyan military began against the Al-Shabaab group of insurgents in southern Somalia.

The mission was officially led by the Somali army, with the Kenyan forces providing a support role. Since then, a series of explosions have rocked various areas in Kenya, bombings which are believed to have been retaliatory attacks by Al-Shabaab. According to this study in the past one and half decade and most recently between 2012 and 2014 there have been at least 20 attacks involving grenades or explosive devices in Kenya. At least 108 people have died in these attacks, and around 300 people injured. However, the presentation addressed some of the perceptions of Mpeketoni residents on terror attacks on socio-economic activities and how terror related activities has led to the destruction of livelihoods and insecurity within Mpeketoni.

The above assertion by authors made contributions on the citizen perception government on response mechanism on counter terror attack. Moreover, the authors have not clearly brought to light resident perception on security issues and its conclusion. This study sought to fill this existing gap. The results revealed that Mpeketoni residents had a lot doubt on their government in dealing with aftermath of terror attack and that there is increase prevalence of terror attack in Lamu County and its surrounding.

2.5 Theoretical Framework

The study utilized social control and deterrent theories in explain the perceptions in question.

2.5.1 Social control theory

Social control theory was developed by Travis Hirschi in 1969. It's also known as the social bond theory. Under the social control theory, individuals break the law due to a breakdown with their societal bond. Moreover, Hirschi refers to four elements which constitute the societal bond. These bonds include: attachment to other individuals, commitment to following rules, Involvement by typical social behaviours and belief - a basic value system. When one of these four items break down, Hirschi hypothesizes that an individual may then participate in criminal activities. For example, if one ceases to engage in typical social behavior (Involvement) or have contact with other individuals (attachment), one may have the time to become involved in deviant criminal activity as Al-Shabaab group did to in Mpeketoni, Lamu County.

Terrorism in its purest form is unilateral self-help by organized civilians who covertly inflict mass violence on other civilians. Pure terrorism is a distinctive form of social control partly akin to warfare that arises with a particular social geometry. It spans extremely long social distances, reaches upward in social space against a collectively, and originates in social islands of solidary relationships. The social control of terrorism reflects the same social geometry and therefore extends beyond conventional criminal justice to a strategy also partly akin to warfare. The technological and other contact that gives rise to terrorism – especially international terrorism – ultimately undermines the social distances that separate the adversaries, and the conditions for its existence finally become the conditions for its demise. This theory concurred with Mpeketoni resident perception on terrorist and their ultimate attack in the region.

According to Roche (2001) preliminary theory of terrorism is more general theory of social control through collective violence. She examines terrorism (along with rioting, lynching, and vigilantism) from the standpoint of pure sociology, specifying elements of its social geometry – its multidimensional location and direction in social space. She features; in particular, the polarization of the social field that attracts terrorism and other collective violence: a high degree of relational distance, cultural distance, functional independence, and inequality between the aggrieved and their adversaries. Terrorism and other collective violence arise with extremely strong partisanship and solidarity among those who participate (Aden, 2001). Strong ties among the aggrieved and a lack of ties to their adversaries make a highly moralistic, explosive, and lethal combination among the terrorist group. This was again reported in Mpeketoni, as terrorist took to wage the attack in group causing loss of lives and destruction of properties.

When an individual engages in criminal activity, the activity is due to a lack of social control from the individual's family or from law enforcement. This theory was significant in explaining the behavior and thinking of terrorists, terrorist groups and even government leadership as they attempt to tackle terrorist threats (Arizon, 2013). The Theory is a theory based on the notion that humans naturally seek personal advantage without regard for the rights or concerns of others. In the absence of external restraints, in a state of nature, crime is a rational choice, a “war of all against all” naturally follows, and the life of everyone is “nasty, poor, brutish, and short.” Fortunately, in Hobbes’s view, a second choice presents itself to individuals capable of calculating the costs and benefits of their actions. They can continue in a state of war, or they can establish a system of laws and a government empowered to punish those who resort to force and fraud in pursuit of their private interests. Given the choice between war and peace, rational people choose to submit to government authority in return for the safety of their persons and property.

The theory assumptions about human nature and the origins of civil society, man is a reasoning being who weighs the costs and benefits of choices and therefore makes decisions based on rational calculations (Business Dictionary, 2013). Terrorists, despite being considered by many to be inhumane and irrational, are nevertheless human beings and are prompted to commit their acts of terrorism by some form of ideology and beliefs, mainly stemming from religious beliefs.

As such, it is crucial that psychoanalysis into the psyche and mindsets of terrorists be undertaken for the results of this research to be valid and empirical. The social control Theory was helpful in understanding the motivations for the terrorist acts of the Al-Shabaab. It has been unclear and thin at best yet it may be the key to helping eradicate terrorism from not only Kenyan society, but the world at large.

While social control theory gives an adequate explanation of non-serious forms delinquency, it fails to explain adult criminal behavior and serious instances of youth crime. Moreover, social control theory is met with some resistance for its compliance to a conservative view of the broader social order (Nyongesa, 2013). From a control theory perspective, children who are properly bonded to their parents would be involved in less crime than children who have weaker parental bonds; social control theory assumes that the family is a naturally law-abiding institution. The theory's biggest weakness is that it places too much importance on the bonds relative to an individual and society, without looking at other concepts like autonomy and impulsiveness. These limitation made .these limitations therefore made this study to compliment the theory with deterrent theory of crime.

2.5.2 Deterrent theory of crime

Deterrent theory of crime is a theory of crime events. The deterrence theory of punishment can be traced to the early works of classical philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes (1588–1678), Cesare Beccaria (1738–1794), and Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832). Together, these theorists protested against the legal policies that had dominated European thought for more than a thousand years, and against the spiritualistic explanations of crime on which they were founded.

However, for some measures—such as broader intelligence and law-enforcement activity or border security, which provide some protection for broad classes of (or even all) targets (Powell, 2007) or specific protective measures that are very effective against specific classes of attacks strategic deterrence may be possible for subsets of the groups that make up the overall terrorist threat to the nation.

USAF General Kevin Chilton (2009) accurately describes deterrence theory when he says:

“Deterrence is ultimately about decisively influencing decision making. Achieving such decisive influence requires altering or reinforcing decision makers’ perceptions of key factors they must weigh in deciding whether to act counter to (our interests) or to exercise restraint.”

This single sentence encompasses the two underpinnings of deterrence; rational choice and risk management. Deterrence and game theory rely upon the premise that people are rational actors. The Rational Actor Model is based on the rational choice theory which posits that humans are rational and will take actions that are in their own best interests. While some criminologists dispute RAM in favor of other models, anecdotally it is difficult to argue with the value of the model. In *The Management of Savagery* by Al Qaeda strategist Abu Baker Naji (2005) he directs planners to weigh the “benefit and harm” of differing actions. This clearly indicates a rational model where a cost benefit calculus is being applied to the operations of a terrorist organization. George Habash of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was quoted as saying: *“The main point is to select targets where success is 100% assured.”* (Jackson *et al.*, 2009). This, again, echoes the model of risk management and a rational model of decision making. While the previous quotes are attributed to terrorist organizations or those associated with terrorist originations, the concept repeats in all areas of behavior.

In addition, these social contract thinkers provided the foundation for modern deterrence theory in criminology. This differs from a majority of criminological theories which focus on explaining why some people commit crimes within the community. That is the motivation to commit crime rather than how criminal events are deterred. Although at first glance this distinction may appear inconsequential, it has important implications for the research and prevention of Terror attacks. For is instance in Mpeketoni where the government of Kenya withdraws the police in affected area and redeployed the Kenya Defense force (KDF) to executed and rooted out the enemies in Boni forest.

According to Zagare (2004) deterrence theory is logically inconsistent, not empirically accurate, and that it is deficient as a theory. In place of classical deterrence, rational choice scholars have argued for *perfect deterrence*, which assumes that states may vary in their internal characteristics and especially in the credibility of their threats of retaliation. Since some aspects of deterrence

and rational choice theories are part of the routine activities theory, deterrence theory has been modified and expanded to include the rational choice perspectives. In summary, support for deterrence theory is much greater than it has been during the past two decades. However, research demonstrates that contemporary KDF in Somalia have helped in countering the terrorism activities in Mpeketoni and other regions in Kenya. Therefore, this study generally examines various opportunity structures that facilitate crime; prevention strategies that are informed by routine activities theory attempt to alter these opportunity structures to prevent criminal events.

2.6 Conceptual framework

The conceptual frame work has been developed mapping on the relationships and interconnectivity between concepts in the objectives of this study. In this study the independent variable are attributes characteristics of the residents of Mpeketoni terror attacks. The dependent variables are the consequences of social, economic and security of Mpeketoni residents.




Figure 2.1 Conceptual Framework

According to figure 2.1, the variables interact and affect each other indicating that dependent variables have a direct influence on the life of Mpeketoni residents. At the same time, some intervening variables such as protection, treatment of posttraumatic disorders, restoration of livelihoods reintegration and social coherence as well as moderating variables such as government policy tend to affect the degree of influence. Terror attacks and threats directly affect the social, economic and security perception of Mpeketoni residents. Terrorist threats and attacks will greatly affect the livelihoods of Mpeketoni residents. The figure further depicts that economic activities, economic and security perception prevailing over the period of this study are likely to be affected by recurrent terror attacks and threats within this region.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presented the methodology that was adopted to carry out the research. It covered the introduction, research design, variables and categories of analysis, site of this study as well as target population and sampling techniques and sample size. Additionally this section also covered the research instruments that were used, validity and reliability measures, data collection and analysis procedures and data management and ethical considerations.

3.2 Study Area

This section presents a description of the study area as shown in figure 3.2.

3.3 Study Area




Figure 3.2: Map of study area

This study was carried out (**Figure 3.2**) within Mpeketoni, Lamu County. Mpeketoni is a small town and an administrative division in the mainland part of Lamu District, Coast Province, Kenya. It is a settlement scheme started in 1960s by the first president of the Republic of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta near a fresh water lake bearing his name. Originally, Mpeketoni and its surroundings were inhabited by Swahilis called Wabajuni and a small hunting and gathering tribe by the name of Wasanye or the Sanyes who are almost extinct. The Agikuyu tribe, which is traditionally a farming community, mostly populates this area. Other tribes found in Mpeketoni include the Luo and Kamba as well as the original local Swahili people. The attacks on Mpeketoni, a small coastal town located near Lamu, a popular tourist resort, have re-cast the spotlight on Kenya as a terrorism hotbed in East Africa. While generating debate over their underlying causes, the Mpeketoni attacks are significant in the way they showcase emerging modifications in the modus operandi of some terrorist outfits in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. Unlike previous attacks, the operatives were selective in targeting their victims. Whereas men were killed, women and children were spared suggesting a deliberate attempt by these groups to improve their image. The attacks claimed 60 lives and further hurt Kenya's tourism sector which has been reeling from the negative effects of previous attacks.

3.3 Research Design

The study adopted descriptive survey research design. The emphasis is on describing rather than on judging or interpreting. The descriptive approach is quick and practical in terms of the financial aspect. The design was chosen because the researcher sought to assess Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities in Lamu County, Kenya. Descriptive studies are not only restricted to fact finding, but may often result in the formulation of important principles of knowledge and solution to significant problems. The design therefore was deemed most efficient in analyzing Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities in Lamu County, Kenya.

3.4 Target Population

The target population for this study was terror victims, Village Elders, Youths and women. This study relied on the area chiefs within Mpeketoni who were familiar with the community to carefully select the target population. The total target population is shown in the table 3.4 below.

Table 3.1: Target Population

Category	Target population
Terror Victims	34
Village elders	14
Youths and women	72
Total	120

According to the table 3.1 above the study had a target population of 200 respondents comprising of terror victims, village elders, youth and women. This category was considered to be paramount in this study since they were the majority who had been affected by the spates of terror attacks.

3.5 Sampling Procedure and Sample size

This study used snowball sampling method to select terror victims and village elders while the key informants (area chiefs and security committees) were purposively sampled. The youths and women were sampled using snowball sampling method. Yamane (1967) provides a simplified formula to calculate sample sizes. This formula was used to calculate the sample sizes as shown below.

$$n = \frac{N}{1+N(e)^2}$$

Where n is the sample size, N is the population size, and e is the level of precision or margin of error at 5% (standard value of 0.05). When this formula is applied to the above sample, we get;

$$n = \frac{172}{1+172(0.05)^2} = 120$$

The sample size below represents 87% of target population in which sampling technique was used to group the target population into homogeneous strata. The percentage of the sample size was as illustrated below;

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Percentage of the sample size} &= \frac{\text{Sample Size}}{\text{Target Population}} * 100\% \\
 &= \frac{172}{200} * 100\% \\
 &= 86\%
 \end{aligned}$$

Table 3.2 below shows the sample size used in this study. For the category of village elders, youths and women the study will deal with those who had not been socio-economically affected by terror attacks but were aware of the terror attacks in the area.

Table 3.2: Sample Size

Category	Sample Size
Terror Victims	23
Village elders	14
Youths and women	83
Total	120

From the calculation using the Yamane formula of sample size in Table 3.2, the sample size was 120 respondents. The sample size represented heterogeneous group that enabled to collections of inclusive data from gender perspective.

3.6 Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis for this study was Mpeketoni residents' comprising of terror victims, village elders, youths and women within Mpeketoni.

3.7 Data Collection Instruments

This study used structured interview schedule to elicit information from respondents. The interview involved closed-ended questions. The interview schedule mainly utilized questions that

attracted Likert scale responses. By doing so, it ensures that the tool is adaptable, built trust and rapport with respondents thereby making it possible to obtain information those respondents probably did not reveal by any other data collection. The schedule was administered to the respondents with the help of one trained research assistant. Use of the research assistant was settled on because of low literacy levels; in addition it ensures collection of accurate information. This study also used focused group discussion (FGDs) in collecting data from security committee. Data collection involved interview schedule to selected respondents. Key information interviews were conducted to obtain data from government officials.

3.8 Validity and Reliability Test

According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) whenever a test or other measuring device is used as part of the data collection process, the validity and reliability of that test is important. Just as we would not use a math test to assess verbal skills, we would not want to use a measuring device for research that was not truly measuring what we purport it to measure. After all, we are relying on the results to show support or a lack of support for our theory and if the data collection methods are erroneous, the data we analyze will also be erroneous. Reliability refers to the extent to which the instrument of research gives consistent data after a number of trials (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003). In order to ensure that reliability was promoted, the researcher ensured that the interview questions draw from the study objectives.

Peer review was sought to ensure that the questionnaire developed are sound in content and structure after which the supervisor shall be requested to review as well .Analysis was done in light of the objectives of the study and also in totality in order to compile a complete picture of the study eventually. Validity is defined as the accuracy and meaningfulness of inferences, which are based on the research results (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003). In other words, validity is the degree to which results obtained from the analysis of the data actually represents the phenomena under study. To properly evaluate the validity of the research, the researcher determined if information obtained from the analysis of the data is accurate and relevant to the topic.

3.9 Data Analysis

Data collected from the field were analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics involved the use of frequency, means and percentages. Inferential statistics involved the use of regression analysis to assess the strength and association of the variables in this study. The results of this study were tested at 95% confidence level. The five point Likert Scale were used to assess aspects of variable in this study. This study yielded both qualitative and quantitative data (see appendix I). Qualitative data were analyzed qualitatively using content analysis, narratives, excerpts, photographs and archives. On the other hand, quantitative data was analyzed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).

3.10 Ethical Considerations

In the process of carrying out the study the following ethical considerations were made: The results were reported with all the honesty and the researcher's opinions do not feature. The study presented the results as they are without any manipulation or undue assumptions. The responses gathered from the subjects were treated with utmost confidence to protect their privacy. The study presented the results accurately and refrained from bias and subjective analysis of data. The study was accountable in capturing and representing all the data and information collected objectively. The researcher obtained official permission to carry out the research from NACOSTI to, collect data from the respondents and worked within the proposed time schedule

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.0 Introduction

This chapter is a presentation of results on Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities in Lamu County, Kenya. The data is presented in tables and graphs as well as charts. Descriptions and discussions are also made based on the objectives of the study.

4.1 Results

4.1.1 Demographic Characteristics of respondents

At the outset, it was important to know the demographic characteristic of the respondents such as gender, age, education level, and occupation. The Knowledge of demographic characteristics of the respondents was necessary for the understanding the views from each category and also its provide a better understanding of the respondents included in the study thus good found for the detailed discussion of the results.

4.1.2 Gender of Respondents

The gender of the respondents was one of the demographic variables that the study noted. From the results, 78 (67%) of the respondents were male, while 42 (33%) were female. This is shown in the Table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1: Gender of Respondents

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Male	78	67
Female	42	33
Total	120	100

Source: Field Data 2016

According to the results in table 4.1 with regards to gender parity, majority (67%) were female while the male counterparts were 33%. This clearly shows that most of the respondents who took part in the study were male. However, this is also an indication that the study did not suffer from gender bias. On the side of terror perception both gender felt the risk on attack. The gender imparity cannot be attributed to anything specific but to the sampling procedure used which was stratified random sampling.

4.1.3 Age of the respondents

This study considered members of the Residents in Mpeketoni aged 18 years and above as its respondents. Age defines the various roles played by different age groups in the society such as labour, security and leadership. In this connection, a person at the age of 18 years and above is considered an adult and is capable of making sound and mature decision including livelihood pursuits and promoting peace. It is for this reason that this study considered persons aged 18 years and above as respondents. This is reflected in Table 4.2 below.

Table4.2: Age of the respondents

Category	Frequency	Percentage
21-30 years	61	50.8
31-40	42	35
41-50	10	8.3
Above 51 years	7	5.8
Total	120	100

Source: Field Data 2016

The results as shown in the Table 4.2 above, indicates that majority of the respondents (50.8%) were between the ages 21-30 years followed by those in the age bracket 31-40 years (35%). 41-50 years (8.3%) while above 51 year 5.8%. the respondents are mostly youthful and reside in Mpeketoni thus the coverage of the study ranges in different age brackets thus its ability to capture the views and opinions of the residents based on the age segments and experience.

4.1.4 Highest level of Education of respondents

In this study education level of the respondents was assessed because it enhances the ability of a person to look at issues more critically and make informed decisions when responding to the questionnaire. The level of formal education is an important variable in any given population. This is because it not only influences the demographic, but also socio-economic characteristics of the population. This is reflected in the Table 4.3 below;

Table 4.3: Respondents' highest level of Education

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Secondary level	23	19.3
Certificate Level	40	33.6
Diploma level	44	37
Degree Level	11	9.2
Masters Level	10	8
Total	120	100

Source: Field Data (2016)

The results of the present study as revealed in table 4.3 above depicts; highest was diploma level (37%) followed closely by certificate level 33.6% while secondary level (19.3%). Degree level (9.2%) while Masters 0.8%. The level of education was vital in understanding perception of terror attack in the study area. According to one of the key informants in Box 4.1;

Box 4.1: Respondent Level of Education

“wazazi wengi hawapeleki wanoa shuleni kwa hofu ya watoto kuchukuliwa na Al-shabaab Ndiposa wengi badaye hawana kazi hapa.... ” (many parents do not take their children to school in fear of their children kidnapped by Al-Shabaab

Interview done on (19th April, 2016)

These results suggest that the respondents in the study depending on the educational level had a clear understanding of the research, what it was about and could respond effectively to the research questions. This study also observed that education level of Mpeketoni was seriously.

4.2 Social Perception on terror attack

In this section, the social effects, once again demonstrates that terrorism and terror activities or threats of terror has caused mistrust among Kenyan communities and has the potential of causing fully blown religious conflicts and suspicions among Kenyan citizens. This study results are presented under various themes, which sought to achieve the research objective under study. The social themes were; interaction/meeting of individuals in public places, community level trust religious functions psychological perception and political perception in Mpeketoni.

Table 4.4: Impact of Terror Attacks on Social Perception

Category	Respondents	Percentage
Very Big Extent	75	64
Big extend	23	18
Small extend	14	10
Very small extend	8	7
Total	120	100

Source: Field data (2016)

The Table 4.4 above indicates that terror attack has had a major impact (64%) on the social perception within Mpeketoni and in consequence the following effects were noted by the respondents as results of the phenomenon. Social amenities such as schools, hospitals and trading centers which originate from the private sector to compliment the public sector had been seriously affected terror. The results concurs with social control theory that pure terrorism is unilateral self-help by organized civilians who covertly inflict mass violence on other civilians activities when there is a break of ties and beliefs. Thus the study sought to study further the level of trust among the Mpeketoni residents;

4.2.1 Level of trust

On the Social perception of terror attack on Kenya’s communities, the researcher sought to find out the level of trust that exists among various communities in Kenya.

According to one of the respondent he claimed;

Box 4.2: Respondent level of trust

“... hawa majangili mnaosema Al-Shabaab ni waislamu ..” (These terrorist you are talking about are Muslims)

Interview done on 19th April 2016

These results in Box 4.2 showed that most people associate terrorism with members of a certain religious affiliation. Besides, most people no longer trust members of other religions, except those that they have known over the years. Therefore, one can easily conclude that terrorism has led to mistrust among Kenyan communities. And since this mistrust is continually getting rooted into religion, it has the potential of developing into fully blown inter-religious conflict.

4.2.2 Effects of terror related activities on social perception

There are direct and indirect effects of terror related activities on social perception within Mpeketoni region thus as illustrated in the Table 4.5 below, on a Likert scale ranging from Very High Extent to Very Low Extent the respondents were asked to rate how various factors have affected the residents social life. Financial flexibility was the most affected with a mean of 3.9 (0.9) followed by tax exposure 3.8 (0.9) and then business risk at 3.5 (1.0).

Table 4.5: Social Perception of the Effects Terror Attacks

	Very high extent	High extent	Medium extend	Low extend	Very low extent	Mean	Std. Dev
Business risk	20	32	55	9	4	3.5	1.0
Tax exposure	6	35	57	17	5	3.8	0.9
Financial flexibility	6	26	62	22	4	3.9	0.9
Growth stage	6	26	48	38	2	3.0	0.9
Market conditions	5	28	48	25	14	3.1	1.0
Mean Index						3.5	

Source: Field data (2016)

According to table 4.5, the least among the means was on growth stage 3 (0.9) and market conditions 3.1 (1.0). The mean index was at 3.5 (70%) thus showing agreement among the respondents that indeed capital flight has affected residents within Mpeketoni.

4.2.3 Interaction of Individuals in Public Places

In relation to the question on how terrorism had affected the area residents social interactions, the study found that as a result of the terrorist attacks residents had been forced to adjust their lifestyles. Some are no attend no local pubs to chew miraa or have a drink for fear that the pub could be a possible terrorist target, while others particularly women avoided window shopping in the numerous Kioks in Mpeketoni town for fear of being terror victims. Also noted was apprehension by area locals to attend public catering, stand at crowded bus stops and board public vehicles occupied by youths from the Somali Community. To quote one of the female respondents in the first FGD as shown in box 4.3 she said;

Box 4.3: A key informant on social perception

“..... kilasiku nimekuwa nikienda mjini na marafiki zangu kununua vitu kama vyakula, nguo na viatu lakini tangu uvamizi sio kila mara twaenda kule tunahofia kufa ama kupatikana mingoni mwa majeruhiwa mikaza ya Al-Shabaab ...” (I have been doing my shopping with my friends particularly for foodstuff but since Al-Shabaab attacked this centre I rarely come to this place anymore coz we fear dying in case of attack again.)

Interview done on 19/04/2016

The above results in Box 4.3 revealed that terrorist attacks has caused trauma among many people and thus they tend to escape from their social and professional responsibilities in that people do their normal activities in fear, which in turn affects their social well-being. Additionally, to terror attacks in Mpeketoni have negatively affected the social life of the residents with respondents claiming that terrorism in the region had deprived them of entertainment and refreshment. As a result, the income capacity of area residents was affected as well as their business activity.

4.2.4 Effects of Terrorism on the Tourism Sector.

In relation to question on effects of the terror on tourism sector, there was direct and indirect effect of terror on tourism. As asserted by one of the respondent as shown in Box 4.4

Box 4.4: Respondent perception on effect of terrorism on tourism

“...tangu Al-Shabaab kufamia hapa wataliii wamepungua sana kufika huku.”

(Since the Al-Shabaab attacked this place, the tourist have reduced coming to this place

The above assertion in Box 4.4 depicted that the tourism industry thrives well in safe and peaceful environments. However, the attacked in Mpeketoni disrupted peace and harmony in destinations which made even international nations to issue notice telling their citizens to avoid touring Kenya. This not only reduced social interaction between the resident with tourist but also disrupted the economy of the region. In addition to these results, it affirmed that in developing countries; safety is one of the factors that contribute to the development of the tourism development. Destinations prone to war, terror attacks or political instability deterred potential tourists from visiting due to perceived levels of risk.

4.2.5 Mpeketoni Residence perception on Religious activities on terror attack

In responding to the study’s question on perception of terror on religious functions, the study found that the attacks had weakened attendance to church services but religious faith have been reinforced. The study found that the number of faithful and religious activities such as overnight prayers drastically declined after terrorist attack. During an in-depth interview with a pastor as shown in box 4.5 he said;

Box 4.5: Respondent’s view on religious perception in terror attack

“....Mimi ni mtumishi wa Mungu lakini maovu yalipoanza kutokea huku Mpeketoni nilianza kuingiwa na hofu hadi sasa hata ingawaje nawaongoza waumini wenzangu...na kwa sababu nimekubali Maulana kama mwokozi wa maisha yangu tunaendelea vyema watu walirudi kanizani ...” (Even though I am a disciple (man) of God...when terror occurred I started fearing about my life even though I have been conducting services for my congregation. And because I believe in God as my saviour people came back to church...”)

Interview done on 19/04/2016

The assertion above in box 4.5 observed that the people of Mpeketoni were afraid to celebrate their religious ceremonies like Eid and observe prayers in the mosques and church because of being terrorist targets. The attack in Mpeketoni was even worse as the resident seem to have been killed along the religious affiliations. Many of the victims were Christians compared to Muslims. However, according to one of the Imam interviewed in Box 4.6 during the study he asserted that;

Box 4.6: A Key Respondents on religious perception of terror attack

Terrorists are not Muslims... In the world a real Muslim or Islam does accept nor advocate killing or mass Killing of innocent people all in the name of religion...as Muslim I condemn their actions and call for all faiths to unite to fight them because you never know who will be targeted next...

Interview done on 19/04/2016

The results in Box 4.6 indicate that stated that due to terrorism, social split widens among the people belonging to the different schools of thought. This split becomes the cause of significant social division which harms the social fabric and unity negatively. In Mpeketoni, Christians and Muslims continue to engage in economic and social activities as both sides have been affected directly and indirectly by the attacks. The study results on feelings of hatred, animosity and revenge increasing within different sects as a result of terrorist attacks however did not explicitly reveal itself in the study.

4.2.6 Significance of Terror Attacks on Social Perception

There was a need for this study to examine the significance of terror attacks on social perception. Terror not only directly affects economic development and prosperity but also has social repercussions and heavily damages human personality and the society as revealed in Table 4.6 below;

Table 4.6: Respondents perception Social Perception of Terror Attacks

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Very high Extend	7	5.8
High Extend	32	26.7
Medium extend	64	53.3
Low extent	16	13.3
High Extend	32	1.7
Total	120	100

Source: Field data (2016)

As illustrated in Table 4.6 above, the extent of significance effect of terror attacks was of interest to the study with medium extent being the highest (53.3%) while high extent was at 26.7%, Low extent (13.3%) and very high extent (5.8%). Moreover the general significant effects of terror attacks on the social activities within Mpeketoni indicate that 78.3% stated terror attacks on social activities being significant to a very significant (11.7%). Upon further inquiry in the in-depth interview, the following responses were noted FGD 18.4.2016 Mpeketoni) and are presented in box 4.7;

Box 4.7. A respondent opinion of Social Perception on terror attack

“...The challenge in explaining the rationale behind target selection for the attacks stems from conflicting perspectives on the causes of the Mpeketoni attacks. Whereas the domestic motivations relate to uneasy relations between the wider coastal region and the Kenyan central government, the foreign ones regard Kenya’s intervention in Somalia. The difficulty in separating the two sets of factors springs from the notion that religious tensions permeate both the insurrectional tendencies in Kenya and the Al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia pointing to prospective interaction between the two conflict situations. The probable external motivations for the Mpeketoni attacks emanate from Kenya’s intervention in the conflict in Somalia...”

Interview done on 19/04/2016

The information in Box 4.7 is very vital in establishing the factors that propagated terror activities within Mpeketoni. It had got great social affiliations and dynamism since initial statements made by the local political leaders including the president of the Republic of Kenya Hon. Uhuru Kenyatta said that the attacks were ethnically instigated being that the area is dominated by the Agikuyu Community mostly who were taken there during President Kenyatta's (father to the current president) reign.

4.2.7 Psychological effect of terror attack

In a conversation with all the respondents, the initial perception to the Al-Shabaab attacks was that of fear. They were especially uncertain on the next attack which has made them afraid to live a normal life. One respondent in box 4.8 said;

Box 4.8: Respondent psychological effect of terror attack

“Huku Kenya maisha imebadilika yenye hofu....labda tukavamiwa tena na Al-Shaabab hata njiani.”*Life in Kenya has changed; nowadays we are afraid Al-Shabaab might attack on the road...*”

Interview done on 20th April 2016

The above sentiments in box 4.8, reveals that terror attack caused psychological ramifications among the residents in Mpeketoni. The people were greatly affected psychologically either directly or indirectly when a terrorist event occurs. The stress level increases and people fear for their safety. According to the residents explain the live after terror; they stated terrorism is a form of psychological warfare against a society. They also adds that “the greater the number of attacks and the more lethal those attacks are, the more people will be psychologically. However, the study noted that the situation was changing with time as the government of Kenya was beefing up the intelligence and security personnel to curb any intended attack in Mpeketoni.

4.2.8 Ethnicity perception on terror attack

The study sought to understand the resident's perception on ethnicity as a cause of terror attack in Mpeketoni. According to a villager elder perception during interview in box 4.9 he said

Box 4.9 Village elder perception on ethnicity

“ .. Wenyaji hapa wanapatashika kila ujao Msomali Oromo na Mkikuyu hawaishi kwa kushirikiana katika shughuli zote. Kila mara kuna mafurukano ...” residents here have rivals every day. Somali or Oromo and Kikuyu do not live in support of each other in their activities... everyday there is rivalry...”

Interview done on 20th April 2016

The results in box 4.9, shows that existence of simmering negative ethnicity suspicion between the communities was perceived could have triggered terror attack by Al-Shabaab with the slightest incitement. Therefore, there is need for concerted efforts by the County Commissioner and the National Government to work together as a team to defuse these tensions for long term peace and stability. The show of cooperation between the local leaders and the National Government might not translate to peace and harmonious coexistence without a local solution to the problem. Therefore, the local communities should spearhead these initiatives. Mpeketoni needs a bottom- up approach to conflict resolution or transformation.

4.2.8 Mpeketoni Residents Political perception on terror attack

This study sought to understand Mpeketoni residents on the political perception on terror attack. According to the FGDs one of the Key respondents in Box 4.10 had this to say;

Box 4.10: Respondent political perception on terror attack

“.. It is this government that has failed us ...taking KDFs to Somalia that is why we are encountering this attacks everywhere...”

Interview done on 20th April 2016

The results in box 4.10, concludes that insecurity has become a tool for political manipulation by government, security agencies and opposition groups. This study further upholds that many residents worried of Al-Shabaab taking over the power in some coastal region including Mpeketoni.

4.3 Economic Perception

In this section, the study results are presented under various themes, which sought to achieve the research objective and answer the main research questions. There was consensus among the respondents who agreed that to significant extent terrorism had negatively affected the area's economy as depicted in the Table 4.7 below.

Table 4.7: Impacts of Terror Attacks on Economic Perception

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	112	93
No	8	7
Total	120	100

Source: Field Data (2016)

The impact of terror attacks on economic activities is depicted in the Table 4.7 above with majority (93%) of the respondents stating that indeed terror attacks has a significant effect among the residents within Mpeketoni region. The respondents stated terrorist activities had affected the way people shop in Mpeketoni leading to a decline in sales of household goods. The study concluded that that one of the most direct impacts of terrorism is on the society's economic well-being as terrorist caused a lot of physical damages on business premises and the residents who incurred the impact were not given enough financial support by the govern to build and run their activities.

In relation to this results a female respondent in Box 4.11 FGD stated;

Box 4.11 Respondent's opinion in economic perception on terror attack

“I have been hacking female's clothes and used to make huge sales especially over the weekend because most women visit this centre but since the attacks occurred sales have Declined and currently I get little profitmay be because most women are afraid of being killed during such terror....”

Interview done on 18.4.2016

The results in Box 4.11, shows that the population in the centre had reduced. Many people seem to seek employment in other place and thus reduced the buyers and seller in the market. This in turn affected the income levels of the business community and area residents who reported a decrease in their daily returns/earnings. However all was not lost in terms of employment as the attacks had led to hiring of more security personnel to beef up security. Respondents concurred that the attacks had forced business owners to invest in extra security measures including employing more security guards. The downside to the move was that the investors were also forced to buy security equipment which is expensive and costly to maintain i.e. body scanners and CCTV cameras. As a result of investing in extra security measures the operational costs for businesses increased leading to the traders raising the prices of their commodities in an attempt to recoup their profit margins as revealed in Table 4.8;

Table 4.8: Terror Attacks and Economic Perception

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agreed	11	9.2
Agreed	93	77.5
Undecided	10	8.3
Disagreed	6	5
Total	120	100

Source: Field data (2016)

As illustrated in table 4.8 above, majority (77.5%) agreed with this while 9.2% strongly agreed. Respondents that were undecided were 8.3% whereas those that disagreed had the least percentage (5%). Further on, the extent to which terror attacks affect economic perception was also under study thus as shown in Table 4.9 below, medium extent had the highest percentage (62.5%) followed by high extent 18.3% while very high extent had 8.3%. Low extent and very low extent had percentages of 6.7% and 4.2% respectively.

Table 4.9: Extent to Which Terror Attacks Affects Economic Perception

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Very significant	96	80
Significant	11	9.2
Neither significant	7	5.8
Insignificant	4	3.3
Very insignificant	2	1.7
Total	120	100

Source: Field Data (2016)

As indicated in table 4.9, when it comes to the general significance of the effect of terror attacks on economic perception, most (80%) of the respondents stated that terror attacks effect on economic perception was indeed Very significant while also, 9.2% stated it to be significant. Neither significant nor insignificant had 5.8%, insignificant (3.3%) and finally very insignificant 1.7%. The research team documented the proceedings and the following typical narrative (FGD Mpeketoni 18.4 2016) is presented in Box 4.12 below;

Box 4.12. A key informant on economic perception of terror attack

Attack costs are driven by the combination of a terrorist group's intent to cause large-scale damage and whether or not current security and preparedness measures leave vulnerabilities in a potential target that the group can exploit to produce significant economic costs. Without a successful attack, there will be no attack costs. In contrast, costs in the other two categories can accrue whether or not an attack actually occurs. If government, businesses, or individuals perceive a risk of attack (resulting from a perceived mismatch between the level of threat and current security and preparedness efforts), the outcome may be an increase in demand for security and preparedness expenditures, costs produced by behavioral changes, or both.

Interview done on 18.4 2016

The results in Box 4.12 clearly illustrates that terror activities within the region had greatly affected the residents of Mpeketoni economically since majority of them lived in fear and could not attend to their daily economic activities such as farming, fishing and weaving. Many

residents perceived the attack to be plan disturbance to ruin their economic activities and make them suffer on behave of the government. Many claim the attack to be indirect to them instead of the government for taking KDFs to Somali to fight Al-Shabaab.

4.3.1 Perception of terror attack on Business activities

This study sought to understand Mpeketoni resident’s perception of terror attack on their business activities business. From observation many resident were seriously affected by the terror. Many business building including their housed were damaged.

According to an in-depth interview in Box 4.13, a business representative he stated that;

Box 4.13 Business respondent’s perception on terror attack

“People have started resuming to their daily business activities in town and rural place the situation is improving.... ... shops are even open to late hours in the night but this wasn’t the case after the attacks as most business people chose to close their shops early for fear of terror targets...”

Interview done on 19/04/2016

The results in Box 4.13 reveals that terror causes economic uncertainty thus limiting investments, employment levels and divert foreign direct investment to safer venues and terrorist campaigns raise the costs of doing business through higher wages, larger insurance premiums and extra security measures. Below are photographs in Plate 4.1 depicting mass destruction during aftermath of terror attack.



Plate 4.1: Showing Economic destruction of terror attack aftermath

Source: Daily Nation Newspaper 18 June 2014

The results in plate 4.1 shows the assailants destruction ranged from the Mpeketoni police station (a semi-hard target), government offices (pillars of the state’s authority), a bank (financial institution), hotels and restaurants (centres for the recreational life of the area). These mass destructions continued to frighten the residents in social security across the spectrum of the political and socio-economic life as they demonstrated the apparent ‘limitlessness’ of their capacity to destabilize the state.

4.3.2 Mpeketoni Residents Perceptions on Land Grievances

The study sought understands the dilemma on land grievances on terror attack. Some residents claimed that land issues have been a problem in the area. Some claimed that the intruders from other regions had bought their land at cheaper prices while others have stolen their land. These claims are said to have contributed to the attack by the terrorist. According one of respondents in Box 4.14 said.

Box 4.14: Response Perceptions on Land Grievances

“... Wenyaji tumenyakuliwa mashamba yetu na hata serikali haijafanya chochote...labda walingoja Al-Shabaab ili watatue shida zetu...” (Us residents our land have been crabbed and the government has not done anything. Maybe they waited for Al-Shabaab to solve this problem)

Interview done 19thApril 2016

The results in Box 4.14 reveal that land disputes have influenced domestic terrorism in Kenya. These results affirmed that land grievances have been politically and ethnically utilised by the politicians to fuel tension and radicalise the youths in the Mpeketoni, Lamu County Kenya. This study concludes that addressing domestic terrorism should incorporate strategies of addressing land grievances and economic inequalities.

4.4 Perception on security about terror attacks

In relation to the third objective of the study it was important to understand the perception of Mpeketoni residents on security perception after terror attack. Since society as a whole changes when affected by terrorism. For examples, in the 9/11 World Trade Centre attacks, for instance, the citizens of New York, and Americans as a whole, changed their way of thinking with respect to security and Muslims, becoming a lot more cautious and aware of their surroundings than before. As shown in Table 4.10

Table 4.10: Perception on security about terror attacks

Response	Respondents	Percentage
Yes	95	81
No	25	19
Total	120	100

Source: Field data (2016)

From table 4.10, the study established that 81% of the respondents were of the opinion that terror attacks affected the security perception of Mpeketoni significantly while 19% were of the contrary opinion. This significantly indicates that acts of terrorism attacks such as those witnessed during June in 2014 significantly had great security implications. Finally, the study noted that terrorism affects people’s daily lives no matter if they were directly affected or not.

4.4.1 Security Effects of Terror Attacks

This study sought to establish the extent to which terror attacks affect security perception among the residents within Mpeketoni. The results are shown Tables 4.11;

Table 4.11: Security Effects of Terror Attacks

Category	Respondents	Percentage
Very Big Extent	75	64
Big extend	23	18
Small extend	14	10
Very small extend	8	7
Total	120	100

Source: Field data (2016)

From table 4.11 above, 64% of the respondents indicated that terror attacks within Mpeketoni region had a great security implication .18% indicated in a big extend manner.10% were of the opinion to a small extend while 7% indicated to very small extend. This implied that terror related activities affected the security perception of Mpeketoni residents significantly.This study observed terrorists respond dynamically to the security measures they encounter or suspect they will encounter. Therefore, to optimize security strategies, the government of Kenya needs to understand how such strategies are likely to affect terrorists' decisions about whether and what to attack .Ideally, deterrence and risk-displacement effects should be “designed in” so that security measures manipulate terrorist decision making as asserted by a respondent in Box 4.15;

Box 4.15 Respondents view on Security Effects of Terror Attacks

“...Whereas Mpeketoni is situated in the restive coastal region of Kenya, early warning indicators of its susceptibility to attack have not been concrete. In May 2014, Fuad Muhammed Khalaf, an Al-Shabaab commander called for revenge attacks on Kenya for her intervention in Somalia, the conventional expectation was that areas hosting foreign tourists would be the prospective targets of attack. The assault unfolded in form of sustained action spread over a relatively short duration. There are some indications that the attacks may have commenced with the assailants infiltrating and assembling in the targeted area. Some eye witnesses reported seeing the red and white Matatu shuttle vans (suspected to have been used in the attacks) parked at Garsen Bridge in Mpeketoni at 5pm local time on the day of the attack...” The picture below shows the aftermath effect of terror attack on police station within Mpeketoni which portrayed an ill preparation of police officers in handling sporadic attacks.

Interview done on 18.4 2016

The above results in Box 4.15 concurs with Waxman (2011) explains that “a sense of victimhood is common to a society experiencing terrorism.” The result may be a “hardening of attitudes and crystallization of opposition to the cause pursued by the terrorists”. Mpeketoni residents were in fear even during the study as some thought we were studying the region for another attack; may be due to scaring aftermath as shown in Plate 4.2



Plate 4.2: Evidence of terror attack

Source: Daily Nation Newspaper 18 June 2014

This study reveals that the attack did not only result in a heightened sense of insecurity, but also impacted on citizens' perception of the country's military, the institution Kenyans trusted most in safeguarding their security. However, the results also show that Kenyans tend to revert quickly to their normal lives; as time passes, security concerns are largely ignored or forgotten.

In another in depth interview in Box 4.16 the respondents placed the blame on the whole government that

Box 4.16 Respondent view on Government security perception

“In the past, these terror attacks were not this frequent. I think this government should just step aside and let the able people lead this great nation. How do people enter Kenya without notice and plan an attack and execute it without any detection? We don't even know who they are or how many the attackers were. All we heard were conflicting reports from government officials.”

Interview done on 18.4 2016

According to Box 4.16 in-depth results concerning security perception the public pressure on the president finally saw him dismiss two government officials (Minister for Internal Security and the Inspector of Police). Security perception on terrorism has seen Kenyans unite against the acts of terrorism. Security perception in Kenya has not only affected the local people, but it has had an effect on Kenya's relation with their international partners. The Kenya Defense Forces (KDF)

on vowed to track down and eliminate Al-Shabaab terrorists who attacked a military camp in Lamu. A KDF search party then tracked the terrorists to Milimani, near Baure, some 10 kilometres from the camp. Four of the terrorists were killed in the ensuing firefight, the KDF said. A rocket-propelled grenade, four AK-47 assault rifles, an improvised explosive device and two hand grenades were found, said Kenya Defense Forces spokesman David Obonyo. Col Obonyo said; *troops were deployed in Lamu, a border county, for Operation Linda Boni that also involves the General Service Unit, National Intelligence Service and other security agencies.*

According to the research results the operation in Boni forest was success, police officers in Malindi arrested four men suspected to be members of a terror cell operating in the town and from Boni Forest. The four were seized at a Nakumatt supermarket. Four other suspected members of the cell had been arrested earlier in the evening at a house near Breeze Point, also in Malindi, after a gunfight with police officers. One of them, identified as Rashid Sultan Mbarak, was killed while a police officer was injured. A shotgun and a revolver were found in the house. Officers also found eight bullets, a laptop, six mobile phones, and photocopies of 18 national IDs belonging to different people, and 15 passport photographs with different names.

The Plate 4.3 below shows police, KDF among security officials during operation.



Plate 4.3: KDF, GSU deployed to flush out Al-Shabaab militia in Boni forest.

Source: <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke> › Kenya ›

The above results in plate 4.3 affirmed that deterrence is a central concept in counterterrorism security, yet it is not well understood or measured without effective deterrence and counterterrorism security. On the other hand, if smugglers can merely shift their operations to smaller ports or land routes, then the benefits of the program may be slight in spite of its narrow deterrent effect. Indeed, security agencies should review and recommended the best strategies in deterrence of terror activity in all regions in Mpeketoni and its surroundings.

4.4.2 Mpeketoni resident’s perception on Government operation

The study sought to understand Mpeketoni residents’ perception on government operation after terror attack. This study found both negative and positive response on government operation after terror attack; many correspondents revealed that Kenyan security forces were slow to respond, leaving villages unprotected after the attacks began. When a combined security team of regular police, administration police, General Service Unit, Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, Kenya Defense Forces, and Kenya Wildlife Service rangers did finally respond, their actions were often discriminatory, singling out Muslim and ethnic Somali communities for beatings, arbitrary detention, and widespread theft of personal property. There have been no successful prosecutions of those responsible for attacks, with the government dropping most of the cases for lack of evidence. According to one of the bitter village elder respondent in Box 4.17 asserted that;

Box 4.17: Respondents perception on Government operations

“... Since the attack by terrorist the police and GSU have been harassing us to surrender any weapons. During the day and night we have started fearing them... some of these security men are rude to us...”

Another respondent view she said;

“...tunashukuru sana Serikali kwa kufika haraka walai tungeuliwa na wale Majangili...” (we thank the government so much for arriving on time we could have been killed by terrorist)

Interview done on 20th April 2016

The above results in Box 4.17, reveals that many residents perceived on government directives inappropriate as security forces carried out most abusive operation in Witu on July 31. They searched homes and shops, beat villagers, arrested men and boys, and stole money and other

valuables, residents said many were injured during the operation. Some resident had to relocate to safer places. According to senior police interviewed he raised concerns that the operation was turned into a commercial enterprise with more focus on payment of allowances than on the substance of the operation. Whilst the operation ongoing, it appeared that most of the officers who came to reinforce the operation were more engrossed in either being paid allowance or waiting to be paid, while others were preparing paper work to support the payments. It would have been prudent that all efforts be geared towards the pursuit of the attackers and payments processed later.

These results concludes that majority of participants perceive terrorist activities negative for the national interest and interest of local people. Few respondents perceived terrorist activities against specific places (cinema, restaurants, shop, etc.) promoting vulgarity according to their point of view. Research results further noted that in cases where a situation after an attack seems to be mishandled, the citizens may lose confidence in the government and public institutions. In order to gain public trust and confidence, the government may take measures that may violate the civil liberties. A government may for example easily pass anti-terror laws that are contrary to human rights simply because they are supported by the public.

4.5 Discussion

This section discusses the results presented in above section. The discussion is aligned to the study objectives; it begin with the discussion of the first objective, which was to assess the Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on social activities and government's response to security improvement, the discussion proceeds to examine the Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on economic activities and government's response to security improvement in Lamu County. This section is concluded with a discussion on Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on security and government's response to security improvement in Lamu County, Kenya

Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on social activities

On the social perception, the results demonstrates that terror activities or threats of terror has caused and increased mistrust among Kenyan communities and has the potential of causing fully blown religious conflicts and suspicions among Kenyan citizens. This study concurs with the

results from Zaman *et.al* (2012) they stated that one of the worst hit social areas by terrorism is education and religious practices. In that “respondents claimed that the waves of terrorism in the province had deprived them of entertainment and refreshment, adding that people were even afraid of having fun in parks”. Consequently, this reduced social activity in the area as well as affected the earning capacity of the locals. As found out by the study, 77.2% of the respondents interviewed during the research strongly believe that terrorism can be associated with one particular religion or religious affiliation. Only 27.8% agree that terror cuts across all religions. This means if the trend continues this way, members of a particular religion may be targeted as a “possible way of eliminating terror”. It was noted that majority of the respondents were against the killing of humans for achieving any positive or negative objective.

They also perceived terrorist activities against government as a loss of common people, property and on the basis of religion against Islam and humanity. They perceived that there may be some external powers which are involved in terrorist activities in Kenya. It was suggested to tackle the issue by promoting respect to humanity, tolerance, upgrading security and acceptability. The above finding concurs with Kaniasty and Norris, (2004) that Perceptions of terror threat do not exist in a vacuum; those around us are likely to influence our risk perceptions. Additionally, conclude that terrorism has led to mistrust among Kenyan communities. And since this mistrust is continually getting rooted into religion, it has the potential of developing into fully blown inter-religious conflict. This has been seen largely as the strategy that is being used by the terror organizations, that is to sow seeds of distrust among Kenyan communities and portray terror as “fighting for the rights of another religious group”.

Mpeketoni residents’ perception of terror attacks on economic activities

It is evident from the results that Kenya economy has suffered negatively from terror attack. According to the finding of Barth *et al.*, (2006) reinforce this observation by stating that although studies investigating the impact of terrorism on economic activity are relatively new, they are rapidly gaining popularity following the devastating events of the 9/11 attack. Barth *et al.* (2006) expound that terrorist incidents have an immediate and direct economic impact on a nation’s capital stock both physical and human. For example, terror led to a significant decrease in influx of tourists from 2011, as compared to before. This has been contributed to largely by travel advisories and bans imposed on Kenya by Western countries and reduction in direct

foreign investments. Majority (77.5%) agreed with this while 9.2% strongly agreed. Respondents that were undecided were 8.3% whereas those that disagreed had the least percentage (5%). Further on, the extent to which terror attacks affect economic perception was also under study thus as shown in table 4.9 below, medium extent had the highest percentage (62.5%) followed by high extent 18.3% while very high extent had 8.3%. Low extent and very low extent had percentages of 6.7% and 4.2% respectively.

Moustapha (2002) noted that one of the most direct impacts of terrorism is on the society's economic well-being. In Kenya, where much of the foreign earning/revenue rely on tourism, agriculture and foreign investors, the economic conditions become more vulnerable whenever there is a terror attack. According to the Kenya Tourism Board (2015), tourism accounts for 12% of Kenya's GDP as of May 2013, generating nearly 21% of foreign exchange earnings and making it the second largest after Agriculture. Mogire and Agade (2011) reported that terrorism affects the economy by undermining tourism sector, which is evident in massive loss of tourists due to travel advisories translating into loss of revenue caused by loss of guests, jobs and foreign earning.

Terrorism has also had a big impact on the tourism industry in Kenya. Many tourists who visit Kenya now mostly visit the national parks, but they avoid the Coastal region as much as possible due to the high Muslim population there and the fact that it is a hotbed of terrorism in Kenya. This follows a number of travel warnings by the western countries to their citizens concerning the terrorist attacks. After the Westgate terrorist attack, the Kenyan president, Uhuru Kenyatta and the Opposition leader Raila Odinga urged western countries to consider not issuing travel warnings to Kenya, as it would harm the economy of the country. When the researcher visited Lamu County where Mpeketoni is located (a coastal city in Kenya frequented by tourists on the summer), there were visibly less tourists on the beaches and after a spot check on some hotels on the coast the researcher realized that most of them were either not occupied or it was mainly occupied by the locals. One manager from a big hotel in Lamu County revealed that, "*Business has been really bad these days* (referring to the period between 2011 and 2016). *In fact, the management is considering relocating to Dar es Salam or any other city which is relatively safe. In the last two years we have had to terminate the contract of half our workers or some have gone on mandatory leaves because we don't have business so we cannot afford paying them.*"

When it comes to the general significance of the effect of terror attacks on economic perception, most (80%) of the respondents stated that terror attacks effect on economic perception was indeed Very significant while also, 9.2% stated it to be significant. Neither significant nor insignificant had 5.8%, insignificant (3.3%) nor finally very insignificant 1.7%.Neumayer (2004) asserted that in terms of economic investments; terrorism affects investors' confidence in the economy. This study observes that in the Kenyan coast region for instance, most Germany and Italian investors in Lamu County where Mpeketoni is located were forced to close down their businesses due to terror threats and insecurity. Pillar (2001) asserted that as a consequence there has been loss of job opportunities for local workers, suppliers and a chain of other stakeholders that rely on hospitality industry. Postuma (2011) further noted that terror activities both in the Kenya and the Somalia international waters have been blamed for economic inflation in the country.

Silke *et al.* (2012) reported that another economic cost of terrorism is in terms of compensation for the losses, medical bills and the general interruption of development plans. For instance, millions of shillings intended for development are now diverted for emergency to cater for victims of terror attacks, reconstruction of the economy destroyed, compensation and reinforcement of security apparatus (Otiso, 2009). Results from this study within Mpeketoni region revealed that the overall result was that terrorism makes an economic environment unstable for investment, leads to loss of human life depended upon for economic growth. The consequences also bring about economic inflation, divert resources, attention and interfere with budgetary planning of the economy. Thus from the finding there is need for the government and other stakeholder to equip themselves with the possible security information and have effective counter terrorism machinery in place.

Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on security and government's response to security improvement

This study postulated that there was a major impact of terror attacks (64%) on the social perception within Mpeketoni and in consequence the following effects were noted by the respondents as results of the phenomenon. Social amenities such as schools, hospitals and trading centers which originate from the private sector to compliment the public sector have been

on the down low. There are direct and indirect effects of terror related activities on social perception within Mpeketoni region thus as illustrated in the Table 4.1 below, on a Likert scale ranging from Very High Extent to Very Low Extent the respondents were asked to rate how various factors have affected the residents social life. Financial flexibility was the most affected with a mean of 3.9 (0.9) followed by tax exposure 3.8 (0.9) and then business risk at 3.5 (1.0). Henderson (2008) reported that terrorism has had massive impact on the social life in Kenya. Today most institutions and premises such as places of worship, schools, shops, restaurants and other public utilities are unsafe. Society as a whole changes when affected by terrorism. Therefore there is need for tight security personnel in the respective premises to guard and report to the relevant authorities for counter attack.

Security checks at airports have since become more stringent and Muslims/ Arabs have become victims of racial/religious profiling, oftentimes being suspected of being terrorists by fellow citizens or law enforcement for no other reason than their appearance. In the case of the 9/11 attack, there was a notable rise of Islamophobia in the US. In Israel during the second intifada, Waxman writes, that the Israelis viewed Palestinians as “dishonest, violent and having little regard for human life.” Stereotyping has resultantly been on the rise, leading people in society to have a negative feeling towards the group that the terrorists claim to represent. For example, when the terrorists separate Christians from Muslims and then kill Christians, this tends to create an image of Muslims as terrorists.

Hostility and suspicion of those that the terrorist group represents is also on the increase in society. In the case of Israel, for example, a study conducted by Asher Arian (2003), Muslims were seen as a security threat to the Israelis. As discussed earlier, terrorism aims to cause fear and concern for personal safety. That concern tends to create negative feelings towards the terrorists and their cause rather than solidarity with their demands. Waxman (2011) explains that “a sense of victimhood is common to a society experiencing terrorism.” The result may be a “hardening of attitudes and crystallization of opposition to the cause pursued by the terrorists” (Friedl and Merari, 2001). Finally, people fear socializing in areas which are prone to terrorist attacks. In Kenya, for instance, the once popular Westgate Mall is now but a shell of its former self. Following the terrorist attacks in 2013, efforts to rebuild the mall back to its former glory have largely been unsuccessful and painstakingly slow because people fear visiting a place that

reminds them of the horrific act of terrorism that occurred therein. This restriction with respect to socializing freely lowers the quality of life as it prevents people from truly enjoying their life and limits where they can patronize, at what time, and so on.

The study observed that 64% of the respondents indicated that terror attacks within Mpeketoni region had a great security implication, 18% indicated in a big extend manner and 10% were of the opinion to a small extend and to the least 7% indicated to very small extend. This implied that terror related activities affected the security perception of Mpeketoni residents significantly. There is a general social mistrust among the residents, representing insecurity. The family institutions have also been affected by terrorism through loss of their members and more recently the fact that children have not been spared by terrorists as victims of injuries and death (Falola, 2002). This study believes that children have also been recruited into terror networks in schools, clubs, churches and mosques. Consequently, the study further notes that terror on social media is also taking advantage of the mass communication techniques, luring young people into joining the networks, sometimes without the knowledge of their parents or guardians.

With respect to the results concerning the Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities and government response to security improvement in Lamu County, Kenya , it was determined that: the Al-Shabaab had a major perception on Kenyans social psychologically, economically, politically and security including an increase in Islamophobia; cases of post-traumatic stress disorder; a decrease in tourism which negatively affected the Kenya; and a rise of discontent about the government and its preparedness against terrorist threats amongst the citizenry.

Consequently, it was conclude that Kenya was a target of the Al-Shabaab because of Kenya military presence in Somalia. According to Some Lamu residents, the government response through security personnel need to undertake include: withdrawing Kenya's forces from Somalia; uprooting corruption from government institutions such as the 53 Immigration department to prevent entry of illegal immigrants who could potentially be terrorists; as well as sealing up Kenya's notoriously porous borders. This will reduce rise of discontent about the government and its preparedness against terrorist threats amongst the citizenry.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter consist of a summary of the results, answers to the research questions outlined in chapter one and conclusion based on the results of this study. Finally, recommendations of the study and suggestion for the further studies were highlighted.

5.2 Summary

The following are the summary of the results according to respective objectives; In regard to the first objective, the finding revealed from Table 4.4 indicates that terror attack has had a major impact (96%) on the social perception within Mpeketoni and in consequence the following effects were noted by the respondents as results of the phenomenon. The attacks had led to some individuals adjusting their lifestyles such that some did not frequent pubs, restaurants and shops as much as they did before. Some residents became fearful of attending religious functions whereas others had to reduce the number of functions they attend. There were a few cases reported of families relocating to other regions within Mpeketoni with the rest shifting from one section of the suburb to another to avoid GSU harassment.

The social control theory and deterrent Theory of crime state that terrorists plan attacks on the basis of mobilization of aggression and political violence to social, economic and political circumstances. These results indicated that terrorists chose to execute attacks using IEDs and grenades in Mpeketoni, with an aim of inflicting both financial and human casualties while passing their political and religious message. In terms of social interactions, Sabir (2007) postulated that “due to fear of terrorist attacks people try to escape from their social and professional responsibilities such that people perform their duties in a state of fear”. This was noted in the study results whereby some individuals in Mpeketoni reduced their frequenting of social places such as restaurants and pubs and others reduced the number of religious functions they attended.

In regard to the second objectives, the study established that terror has a negative perception on the economic and social wellbeing of the residents of Mpeketoni. From Table 4.7 most (80%) of the respondents stated that terror attacks effect on economic perception was indeed Very significant while also, 9.2% stated it to be significant. Neither significant nor insignificant had 5.8%, insignificant (3.3%) and finally very insignificant 1.7%.The study further revealed that economically, terrorists had created fear among entrepreneurs in Mpeketoni with some opting to moving their business to 'safer' zones.

As a result there was loss of employment opportunities after the entrepreneurs and some area locals went to other areas leaving casual labourers 'providing vital services such as washing of clothes, cars, carrying goods to seek employment in open markets. Additionally, businessmen and women in the area to increase extra security measures to safeguard their property and their customers also led to a rise in operational cost. This led to an increase in the price of goods and services as the traders sought to regain their profit margins. There was also an increase in the prices for basic commodities such as food, water and rent as some suppliers opted not to supply goods to the area for fear of terror.

In regards to the third objective, perception on terror attack the study results From table 4.7, revealed that 81% of the respondents were of the opinion that terror attacks affected the security perception of Mpeketoni significantly while 19% were of the contrary opinion the fluid interaction between the insurrectional tendencies in Kenya and the conflict in Somalia also shaped the tactical framework for the attacks. The ethno-religious dichotomy in Mpeketoni not only presented Al-Shabaab with an exploitable parameter related to its motivation but also a precise criterion for meeting operational objectives.

The same supposition as the attacks in Mpeketoni accorded the assailants the opportunity to exercise the element of surprise in attacking an area the Kenyan security apparatus least expected. This led to an increase in operational costs, prices of goods and services, loss of employment and investment uncertainty as investors were fearful of future attacks. Thus security risks and safety are of such as large concern in today's societies and brings around profound changes of the political order, shaping perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of people, political leaders and of governments (Beck 2002).Consequently, the increasing global spread of the

terrorist threat means that increasing numbers of people, previously remote from conflict areas, are now faced with threats either at home or when travelling or living overseas.

5.3 Conclusions

5.3.1 Theoretical Conclusions

Theoretically, terrorism in its purest form is unilateral self-help by organized civilians who covertly inflict mass violence on other civilians. Although the SCT contrasts with theories that explain the origins of choice, there is a considerable conceptual overlap between the SCT and more sociological theories of offending and suggestions for theoretical integration are common. However, it is incompatible with explanations that argue that structural conditions or socialization produce character defects that make an offender's decision-making distinct from that of non-offenders (Dahlbäck, 2003). In sum, the social control theory provided a fruitful approach to understanding social behaviour of terrorist during Mpeketoni attack.

This study utilized on social control theory; perceptions about social and institutions probably have the greatest influence on particular people: individuals who have a considerable stake in society, have internalized norms that prohibit offenses, are embedded in networks of people who appear to follow the law most of the time and whose criminal experiences are limited to a small number of common petty offenses. In other words, these perceptions may have their greatest effects on those who have few of the motivations or opportunities that encourage crime. The current study was able to establish that formed belief leads individual or group to formulate the crime activities to society against the will of others. This emerged from some respondents who claimed that Al-Shabaab commit crime due to religious belief.

Social control suggests that society as an institution create opportunities for crime. In other words, the daily routine activities of people including where they work, the routes they travel to and from school, the groups with whom the socialize, the shops they frequent, and so forth strongly influence when, where, and to whom crime occurs. These routines can make crime easy and low risk, or difficult and risky. Opportunities vary over time, space, and among people, so too does the likelihood of terror attack in the world of crime. Therefore, research that stems from social control theory generally examines various opportunity structures that facilitate crime;

prevention strategies that are informed by the theory attempt to alter these opportunity structures to prevent criminal events.

Understanding government improvement response in security counterterrorism security deterrent theory was used compliment the earlier theory. Proponents of deterrence believe that people choose to obey or violate the law after calculating the gains and consequences of their actions. Overall, however, it is difficult to prove the effectiveness of deterrence since only those offenders not deterred come to the notice of law enforcement. Thus, we may never know why others do not offend. Deterrence may be the most important effect of some counterterrorism security programs; these research results may be useful to security policymakers who are trying to increase the security benefits through limited resources. Researchers have used various methods to test hypotheses derived from the theory. Since its inception, the theory has become closely aligned with a set of theories and perspectives known as environmental criminology, which focuses on the importance of opportunity in determining the deterrence of crime across time and space.

Deterrence was thought to be driven primarily by the likelihood and severity of punishment expected for committing a crime. Although both the likelihood and the severity of punishment surely play some role in the decision-making of terrorists, there are important differences between the objectives of terrorist organizations and individual criminals. For instance, most criminal activity has the objective (or hope) of avoiding accountability for the crime. The same may not be true for many terrorist acts. The terrorist may be satisfied with overcoming security countermeasures and executing the attack effectively, and have little regard for his or her fate afterward and only modest concern about the consequences to his or her organization. Indeed, as long as the utility of the operation is great enough to the terrorist group, the threat of significant punishment as a deterrent may count for little. Given these differences between ordinary crime and terrorism, In this regard, this study focused on government response to security improvement in Lamu County.

Deterrent theory in particular, has very practical implications for prevention; therefore, practitioners have applied deterrent theory to inform police practices and prevention strategies. This research study contains a review of the evolution of deterrent theory; a summary of research

informed by the theory; complementary perspectives and current applications; and future directions for theory, research, and prevention.

5.3.2 Empirical Conclusions

Although Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attacks, among others, citing Kenya's intervention in Somalia as a motivating factor, the Kenyan government attributed them to domestic politics rooted in ethnic and religious tensions in the country. The study found out the social perception of terror attack on socio economic activities among Mpeketoni residents was underpinned by the results that some area residents were fearful of attending religious events, public gatherings and visiting public places such as pubs and restaurants. The results augured with Zaman *et al.* (2012) and Zalman (2013) who stated that terror affects "the social interactions of those affected". From the FGDS results Mpeketoni was targeted because it's simmering social tensions fitted in with the fluid interaction between the dynamics fueling instability in the wider coastal region of Kenya and the conflict in Somalia. The colonial and post-colonial resettlement policies of the Kenyan state altered the ethnic and religious set up of Mpeketoni creating prospective parameters for the fomentation of social tensions in Lamu, the county in which Mpeketoni is located. Whereas these factors by themselves were insufficient to trigger off the attacks, their fluid interaction with secessionist tensions in the restive coastal region of Kenya and the Al-Shabaab Islamist insurgency in Somalia constituted Mpeketoni into a prospective target of attack.

In light of the research and observations on second objective of the study, the Interpretation and analysis of the data shows that some traders sought to invest in extra security measures to safeguard their property and their customers also saw a rise in operational cost. However, the overarching factor on urban design accorded prospective assailants avenues for disengaging from the theatre of operations and retreating into a sanctuary beyond the territorial jurisdiction of Kenya. Although Mpeketoni had the ethno-religious profile that would have constituted it into a conflict hotspot, it lacked the specific target selection credentials for the coastal region. By not being a foreign tourist destination, Mpeketoni accorded the assailants the opportunity to exercise the element of surprise in attacking an area the Kenyan security apparatus least expected. This study concurred with Klein (2007) who states that "in addition to the casualties and physical destruction directly caused by their attacks, terrorists seek to inflict wider psychological, social,

political, and economic damage upon the societies they target”. Thus security perception among Mpeketoni residents is negatively perceived. However, after the attack the government militia in Boni forest was set up to flush out the terrorist. The first batch of security forces set up camps in four regions within two counties bordering Boni forest, hours after the Inspector General of Police declared the area dangerous. A battalion of the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) together with the paramilitary wing of General Service Unit and police officers pitched camp at Bodhai and Hulugo in Ijara sub County of Garissa County while another group was deployed to Mangai and Baure in Lamu County.

The first batch of security forces set up camps in four regions within two counties bordering Boni forest, hours after the Inspector General of Police declared the area dangerous. A battalion of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) together with the paramilitary wing of General Service Unit and police officers pitched camp at Bodhai and Hulugo in Ijara sub County of Garissa County while another group has been deployed to Mangai and Baure in Lamu County. The three-month operation is expected to flush out Al-Shabaab militants reportedly hiding within the expansive forest along the Kenya-Somali border. Reports indicated last evening that the forces bombed sections of the forest using helicopters. The arrival of the security team caused fear and anxiety among residents many of whom were displaced from Basuba in Lamu where the militants’ activities have been on the rise since May 2015. The families are ethnic Wata and Wasanye, who are hunters and gatherers that also subsist on forest farming.

Emerging from the discussion between the insurrectional tendencies in the coastal region of Kenya and the conflict in Somalia, A Large number of respondents claimed Mpeketoni cannot be stabilized in isolation. Equitability in the control and distribution of political and economic power should not only be affected in this settlement but also extended to Lamu, Mombasa and other restive parts of the Kenyan coastal region. Stabilizing the political situation in Somalia is also critically important for the security of Mpeketoni. Whereas the deployment of Kenyan forces in Somalia has lowered the propensity for Al-Shabaab to attack the East African country, more work still needs to be done to secure the forested frontier separating the two countries to prevent cross-border insurgent infiltrations.

5.4 Recommendations

This study has two sets of recommendations: the practical recommendations to address the practical and policy issues in Mpeketoni, and the academic recommendations to address recommendations on further research to fill the missing links. This is handled under the following subsections:

5.4.1 Policy Recommendations

- i. Disaster management agency should concern themselves with strengthening Nyumbekumi Approach and neighbourhood watch groups to vet persons moving into the area and report any suspected persons likely to be involved in terrorism
- ii. The government should set aside money to continually invest in security measures rather than wait for an attack to purchase equipment or deploy security after attack (proactive rather than reactive).
- iii. The government should be committed to resolve the pending land-related issues in the study area and finalize the resettlement process. This will be important because it is mainly the government that has the absolute mandate, obligation and all that it takes to make the final decision on how to resolve/counter the persistent terror attack in the study area.

5.4.2 General recommendations

- i. The government should enhance Security and Preparedness Measures to its citizens through civic education or create public awareness
- ii. The government should continuously empower Intelligence Collection Techniques. This will ensure help in dealing with cyber insurgents' human intelligence (HUMINT) on the operation of non-state actors in cyberspace.
- iii. The government should Designing Anti-terrorism Systems. Such a system should bring together diverse state-of-the-art technologies to enable persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions, and enable potential actions.

5.5 Areas for Further Research

This study was mainly concerned with assessment of Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities in Lamu County, Kenya. The results in this study were not conclusive but there are more open avenues for some areas of investigations. The following are some of the suggestions for further studies:-

- i. The perception of Mpeketoni residents on current-counter-terrorism measures in Kenya.
- ii. More substantive and theoretically informed research is needed with respect to the relationship between terror attacks and economic growth
- iii. Analysis of past and current effect of terrorism on tourism in Kenya with regard to Coastal region.
- iv. A similar study should be carried out in other regions like that have experienced terror attack and compare the experiences so as to gauge if the current recommendations can be replicated for adoption at the national level.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: DATA ANALYSIS MATRIX

Research objectives/ questions	Independent Variables	Intervening variables	Dependent Variables	Quantitative /qualitative methods of data analysis	Qualitative methods of analysis
What is the Mpeketoni residents' social perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities in Lamu County, Kenya?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Age • Gender • level of education • Ethnicity • Religion affiliation • Party affiliations • Voter politics 	Protection Treatment of post-traumatic disorders Restoration of livelihoods. Reintegration and social cohesion	Terror threats	Descriptive statistics e.g Univariate analysis Bivariate analysis	Content analysis Narratives Excerpts Photographs/ videos Archives-
What is the Mpeketoni residents' economic perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities in Lamu County, Kenya?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Land ownership • Unemployment • Food shortage 	Protection Treatment of post-traumatic disorders Restoration of livelihoods. Reintegration and social cohesion	Terror Attacks	Quantitative /qualitative methods of data analysis e.g. Journals and newspapers	Content analysis Narratives Excerpts Photographs/ videos Archives

<p>How is the Mpeketo ni residents' security perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities in Lamu County, Kenya?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fear • intelligence • surveillance 	<p>Protection Treatment of post-traumatic disorders Restoration of livelihoods. Reintegration and social cohesion</p>	<p>Terror threats</p>	<p>Quantitative /qualitative methods of data analysis Mean and standard deviation</p>	<p>Content analysis Narratives Excerpts Photographs/ videos Archives</p>
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Appendix II: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

1. Gender

Male

Female

2. Age (years).....

3. What is your Highest Level of Education?

.....
.....
.....

SECTION B: SOCIAL PERCEPTION OF TERROR ATTACKS

1a) which are the main social activities in this area?

.....
.....
.....

1b) Did the terrorism affected social development among Mpeketoni residents?

.....
.....

2. If yes explain.....

.....
.....

3. Do you agree that terrorism affect social development among Mpeketoni residents?

Strongly Agree

Agree

Undecided

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Explain.....

4. On a scale of 1-5, where 1=Very significant, 2=Significant, 3 =Neither significant nor insignificant, 4= Insignificant and 5=Very insignificant; How would you rate the general significant effect of terrorism on social development among Mpeketoni residents?

Very significant ()

Significant ()

Neither significant nor insignificant ()

Insignificant ()

Very insignificant ()

5. On a scale of 1-5, where 1= Very High Extent, 2= High Extent, 3 = Medium Extent, 4= Low Extent and 5=Very Low Extent; how do you rate the effect of terror experiences on the following social development among Mpeketoni residents.

	Very High Extent	High Extent	Medium Extent	Low Extent	Very Low Extent
Category	1	2	3	4	5
Places of Worship					
Clubs and Restaurants					
Schools					
Public Utilities					
Family Institution					

SECTION C: ECONOMIC PERCEPTION OF TERROR ATTACKS

1. What are the main sources of livelihoods among residents within Mpeketoni region?

.....
.....

2. Does terrorism affect economic activities among Mpeketoni residents?

.....
.....

Explain your answer

.....
.....

3. To what extent does terrorism affect economic activities among Mpeketoni residents?

Very High Extent

High Extent

Medium Extent

Low Extent

Very Low Extent

Explain.....

.....
.....

4. On a scale of 1-5, where 1=Very significant, 2=Significant, 3 = Neither significant nor insignificant, 4= Insignificant and 5=Very insignificant; How would you rate the general significant effect of terror experiences on economic among Mpeketoni residents?

Very significant ()

Significant ()

Neither significant nor insignificant ()

Insignificant ()

Very insignificant ()

Explain your answer

.....

5. On a scale of 1-5, where 1= Very High Extent, 2= High Extent, 3 = Medium Extent, 4= Low Extent and 5=Very Low Extent; how do you rate the effects of terror experiences on the following economic factors among Mpeketoni residents?

	Very High Extent	High Extent	Medium Extent	Low Extent	Very Low Extent
Category	1	2	3	4	5
Business Risk					
Tax Exposure					
Financial Flexibility					
Growth Stage					
Market Conditions					

SECTION D: SECURITY PERCEPTION OF TERROR ATTACKS

1. Have you ever experienced terror attacks?

Yes ()

No ()

2. If yes how did it the attack affect your security perception within Mpeketoni region?

Explain.....

.....**b)** Does terror attacks have security perception implications among Mpeketoni residents?

Yes ()

No ()

Explain.....
.....

3. Do you agree that terror attacks have security perception implications among Mpeketoni residents?

Explain.....
.....

4. How do you rate the extent to which terror attacks contributes to security perception among Mpeketoni residents?

- Very High Extent
- High Extent
- Medium Extent
- Low Extent
- Very Low Extent

Explain.....
.....

5. On a scale of 1-5, where 1=Very significant, 2=Significant, 3 =Neither significant nor insignificant, 4= Insignificant and 5=Very insignificant; How would you rate the general significant effect of terror attacks on security perception among Mpeketoni residents?

- Very significant ()
- Significant ()
- Neither significant nor insignificant ()
- Insignificant ()
- Very insignificant ()

Thank you for your cooperation

APPENDIX III: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR KEY INFORMANTS

PART A: SOCIAL PERCEPTION

1. What is the Mpeketoni residents’ social perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities in Lamu County, Kenya?

.....
.....

2. What was your level of awareness on terror attacks before the June 24th 2014 Mpeketoni Attack

- A 1-Fully aware
- B 2-Aware
- C 3-Not sure
- D4-Partial aware
- E 5-Not aware

3. How do you rate the threat of terrorism happening in your country?

- A 1-It will never happen
- B 2-It will not happen
- C 3-It will happen
- D4-It could possibly happen
- E 5-I do not know

4. Kindly, provide the level of trust between communities after terror

.....
.....
.....

5. How is the interaction after terror attack among residents in Mpeketoni?

.....
.....

6 Briefly, explain the current state of religious activities after terror attack

.....
.....

1. Kindly explain to us the leaders perceptions after terror attack in Mpeketoni

.....
.....
.....

2. Do you sometimes experience thoughts after terror attack? YES [] NO []

If yes, explain.....

.....

PART B: ECONOMIC PERCEPTION

i. What is the Mpeketoni residents' economic perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities in Lamu County, Kenya?

.....
.....

ii. What in your view can be done to deal with the effects of terrorism on economic activities within this area?

.....
.....
.....

iii. Briefly, state the kind of business activities that were affected during terror attack

.....
.....

iv. Have you have experience land grievances in Mpeketoni? YES [] NO []

If yes, briefly explain

.....
.....

v. Do you think land grievance has link with terror attack? YES [] NO []

If yes, briefly explain.....

.....

PART C: SECURITY PERCEPTION

i. How is the Mpeketoni residents’ security perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities in Lamu County, Kenya?

.....
.....

ii. Are you aware of any imminent terrorist activities in your area?

.....
.....

iii. What in your view can be done to deal with the effects of terrorism in this area?

.....
.....

iv. What was your perception on government operation after terror attack?

.....
.....

v. How would you describe the efforts by various stakeholders in preventing terrorist activities from occurring in the future?

.....
.....

vi. How would you characterize terrorist threats recorded in the last one year?

.....
.....

vii. Are there any attempted attacks that you managed to contain before they occurred?

.....
.....

viii. What are some of the implications of terror attacks within your area?

.....
.....

APPENDIX IV: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION FOR SECURITY COMMITTEE

Background information

Although no group immediately claimed responsibility for the first attack, Kenyan army spokesman Major Emmanuel Chirchir said the "assailants [are] likely to be Al-Shabaab". Al-Shabab claimed responsibility for the second attack, saying its members had killed 20 people. The group stated that the attacks were "revenge for the presence of Kenyan troops in Somalia and the killing of Muslims." Eyewitnesses to the attacks also reported seeing the Al-Shabaab flag. However, Kenyatta asserted that local politicians, who were connected with a network of gangs, had instigated the attacks, and dismissed Al-Shabaab's claim of responsibility.


Many locals accused the Kenyan government of attempting to enrich Kikuyus by giving them land. This grievance was also behind the fatal ethnic violence that took place following the disputed 2007 Kenyan elections. President Kenyatta, a Kikuyu himself, described the attacks as "politically motivated ethnic violence against a Kenyan community, with the intention of profiling and evicting them for political reasons". Correspondents from the area conjectured that ethnic Somali or Oromo residents may have perpetrated the attack and attempted to deflect blame onto Al-Shabaab by using the group's flag as a guise. On 25 June, Lamu County Governor Issa Timamy was arrested on charges related to the attack. In this connection therefore, the research team conducted focused group discussions in the different divisions namely; Kiongwe, Baharini, Mkunumbi, Bomani, Uziwa, Mapenya, Lakeside, Kibaoni, Hongwe and Tewa.

The topics for FGDs are presented based on the specific research objectives. The following thematic areas were developed to guide the discussions;

- i. Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on social activities and government's response to security improvement in Lamu County, Kenya
- ii. Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on economic activities and government's response to security improvement in Lamu County, Kenya
- iii. Mpeketoni residents' perception of terror attacks on security and government's response to security improvement in Lamu County, Kenya

APPENDIX VI: RESEARCH PERMITS





**NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION**

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2343249, 2128071, 2119628
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Website: www.nacosti.go.ke
When replying please quote

REGISTRATION NUMBER
K.P.S. 100/0000000000
K.P.S. 100/0000000000

Ref. No.

NACOSTI/P/16/63405/14075

Date:

5th October, 2016


Patrick Kiplangat Ronoh
Egerton University
P.O. Box 536-20115
EGERTON.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on *"Mpeketon residents' perception of terror attacks on socio-economic activities in Lamu County, Kenya,"* I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Lamu County** for the period ending **5th October, 2017**.

You are advised to report to the **County Commissioner and the County Director of Education, Lamu County** before embarking on the research project.

On completion of the research, you are expected to submit **two hard copies and one soft copy in pdf** of the research report/thesis to our office.


**BONIFACE WANYAMA
FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO**

Copy to:

The County Commissioner
Lamu County.

The County Director of Education
Lamu County.

CONDITIONS

1. You must report to the County Commissioner and the County Education Officer of the area before embarking on your research. Failure to do that may lead to the cancellation of your permit.
2. Government Officer will not be interviewed without prior appointment.
3. No questionnaire will be used unless it has been approved.
4. Excavation, blasting and collection of biological specimens are subject to further permission from the relevant Government Ministries.
5. You are required to submit at least two(2) hard copies and one (1) soft copy of your final report.
6. The Government of Kenya reserves the right to modify the conditions of this permit including its cancellation without notice.



REPUBLIC OF KENYA



National Commission for Science,
Technology and Innovation
**RESEARCH CLEARANCE
PERMIT**

Serial No. A **11203**

CONDITIONS: see back page

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:
MR. PATRICK KIPLANGAT RONOH
of EGERTON UNIVERSITY, 22590-100
Nairobi, has been permitted to conduct
research in Lamu County

on the topic: **MPEKETONI RESIDENTS'
PERCEPTION OF TERROR ATTACKS ON
SOCIO-ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN LAMU
COUNTY, KENYA**

for the period ending:
5th October, 2017

Permit No : NACOSTI/P/16/63405/14075
Date Of Issue : 5th October, 2016
Fee Received : Ksh 1000



[Signature]
Director General
National Commission for Science,
Technology and Innovation